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Abstract 
For over a decade, welfare migration
1
 has been a much discussed topic in Europe. Since the 
2004 enlargement of the EU, there has been widespread concern in the “old” member states 
that their relatively more extensive welfare systems are attracting migrants from the “new” 
and poorer member states. These concerns must be viewed in light of the challenge that the 
EU and EU citizenship – which provides EU citizens with the right to move and reside freely 
within the EU/EEA – pose to national citizenship, national institutions and national 
sovereignty.  
An interesting aspect of the discussion on welfare migration is that there is uncertainty among 
researchers whether welfare actually is a determinant of migration within the EU/EEA. And if 
there is an effect, they argue, it is negligible. Regardless of whether welfare attracts migrants 
or not, perceptions of welfare migration (like all assumptions) have the potential to influence 
policy. While many studies have attempted to measure the effect of so-called welfare 
magnets, there has been little research on what constitutes different perceptions of welfare 
migration, and how these perceptions are expressed. This study sets out to investigate the 
following question:  
Which perceptions of welfare migration, within the context of the EU/EEA, exist and 
dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark?  
The analysis reveals that there exists a scale related to the problem definition of welfare 
migration. At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed considered a challenge to 
national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of the scale, welfare 
migration is not considered a problem at all. Rather, labor migration within the EU/EEA is 
seen as problematic because it threatens workers’ rights and leads to social dumping.   
  
                                                 
1
 Defined as the choice to migrate to a country based on the generosity of that country’s welfare 
system. 
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1 Introduction 
The broad topic of this thesis is welfare migration in the context of the European Union (EU) 
and the European Economic Area (EEA). More specifically, the thesis investigates which 
different perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Welfare migration
2
 is defined as the choice to migrate to a 
country based on the generosity of that country’s welfare system. By conducting a qualitative 
content analysis within an analytical framework of three different models of the EU as a 
democratic polity, this study seeks to place the discussion on welfare migration within the 
larger discussion on European integration. 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU sparked a discussion on the topic of welfare 
migration in Europe, among politicians and policymakers as well as ordinary citizens (De 
Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009; Giulietti & Wahba, 2012; Warin & Svaton, 2008). While it has 
been more than a decade since the historic Eastern enlargement, the debate on welfare 
migration continues and is as relevant today as ever. At the core of the debate lies a concern, 
mainly expressed in the pre-enlargement countries (the EU-15
3
), that member states with 
extensive welfare systems are attracting migrants from member states with less extensive 
systems – thus inflicting unreasonable burdens on the countries with the more generous 
systems (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 2; De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2006, p. 2). This debate can 
be seen as a symptom of the challenge that the EU poses to the member states’ national 
institutions and sovereignty. The concern for welfare migration is strongly connected with EU 
citizens’ right to move and reside freely within the EU/EEA4, as this is thought to enable the 
abuse of national welfare systems. Because citizens of other EU/EEA countries have the right 
to choose which state they want to live in, and to not be discriminated on the basis of 
nationality, intra-EU migration also challenges national perceptions of political community 
and citizenship. Since freedom of movement is one of the core values of the EU (Council of 
the European Union, 2013), however, the discussion is one of controversy. 
                                                 
2
 Also referred to as “welfare tourism” and “benefit tourism”. For an alternative definition, see 
Constant (2011, p. 6).  
3
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.  
4
 Introduced as a central component of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, the right to move 
freely is secured in Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This 
freedom is further specified in Directive 2004/38/EC. Freedom of movement for workers, a long-
established right, is ensured in Article 45 of the TFEU.  
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Welfare migration is a public concern in many European countries. One example of this is the 
longstanding discussion in Norway concerning the export of child benefits to Eastern 
European countries. A central argument in this debate is that the cost of living is much lower 
in Eastern European countries than in Norway and that child benefit payments based on 
Norwegian price levels are attracting migrants who seek to exploit the Norwegian welfare 
system. Adding fuel to the fire is the perceived EEA “meddling” with the national prerogative 
to determine who are entitled to child benefit, such as the 2013 EFTA Court ruling that 
Norway cannot discriminate between EEA workers’ right to child benefit based on marital 
status (EFTA Court, 2013).  
Showing the extent of public concern is a 2014 Eurobarometer survey which reports that 
immigration now ranks as the third most important national issue after unemployment and the 
economic situation (European Commission (EC), 2014). Providing more direct proof in terms 
of welfare migration are the results from the spring wave of the 2009 Eurobarometer; when 
asked to respond to the statement “immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from 
health and welfare services”, 51 per cent said that they disagreed, whereas only 22 per cent 
said that they agreed (EC, 2010). 
Further evidence is a letter that was co-authored by the British, German, Austrian, and Dutch 
ministers of justice and home affairs (JHA) and sent to the (then) Irish Presidency of the 
Council of the European in May 2013. In the letter, they express concern about the effects on 
national welfare systems as a result of free movement within the enlarged EU (Jølstad, 2013). 
This was also a topic at the JHA council meeting in June 2013, where the EC was asked to 
review the implementation of the free-movement rules and present a report to the JHA council 
by the end of the year (Council of the European Union, 2013). While finding that job 
opportunities and family were important motivating factors behind EU/EEA migration, the 
EC found little evidence supporting the claim that EU migration is motivated by welfare 
benefits (Jølstad, 2013). 
The preceding establishes welfare migration as a current and much discussed public concern 
in the EU/EEA. The following section presents and explores the background for the European 
welfare migration debate, with the goal of providing a basis for understanding why welfare 
migration has become such an important issue. 
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1.1 Background 
The 2004 enlargement of the EU is considered historic not only because it was the single 
largest expansion of the EU to date, but also because it brought a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries
5
 that had formerly been part of the Eastern Bloc, into its fold. 
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, these two enlargements constitute what 
is referred to as the fifth wave of enlargement. 
Prior to the enlargements, economists highlighted the potential economic gains of removing 
barriers to trade, capital flows and migration in an enlarged EU. Geographical mobility of 
workers was seen as particularly beneficial, as it should improve the allocative efficiency of 
the EU markets – thereby strengthening the economy and contributing to alleviate the 
financial strain caused by an aging population and declining fertility rates in the old member 
states (Constant, 2011; De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2006; Kahenec, 2012). While most economists 
looked at the enlargement with optimism, many politicians and policy makers in the EU-15 
harbored serious concerns regarding the economic and political disparities between the 
acceding and the old member states. In addition to the substantial differences in income 
between the old and the new member states, the limited political, economic and social contact 
between the East and the West during the previous decades, as well as the sheer scale of the 
enlargement, could explain the magnitude of the controversies surrounding it (Kahenec, 2012, 
pp. 2–3). Furthermore, the media played an important role in portraying the enlargement as an 
encroachment on the old member states, with far-reaching economic, social, cultural and 
political consequences (Constant, 2011, p. 2). 
Because the internal market (ensuring the free movement of goods, capital, services and 
people) was already in place by the time of the enlargement, the most common pre-
enlargement fears were mass migration, welfare migration, and native labor displacement 
(Constant, 2011, p. 6; Kahenec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2010, p. 4). The enlargement also 
raised questions about the impact of larger migration flows on the welfare state institutions of 
the receiving countries, and ultimately about their sustainability – a common fear being that it 
would lead to a European race to the bottom in terms of welfare policies (De Giorgi & 
Pellizzari, 2006, p. 2; Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 1). These pre-enlargement fears manifested 
themselves in transitional arrangements, introduced by most of the EU-15 countries following 
                                                 
5
 Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia.  
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the 2004 enlargement. In direct contradiction to the principle of free movement, these 
arrangements allowed the old member states to retain their national laws and policies for a 
maximum period of seven years
6
, thus effectively refusing the newcomers access to their 
labor markets. Only Sweden, Ireland and the UK
7
 opened access to their labor markets 
immediately following the accession. Finland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal lifted their labor 
market restrictions in 2006, with the Netherlands and Luxembourg following in 2007, France 
in 2008, and Belgium and Denmark in 2009. Only Germany and Austria kept the restrictions 
in place for the maximum period of seven years (Constant, 2011, pp. 2–3; Kahenec et al., 
2010, pp. 4–5). While the transitional arrangements were meant to prevent migration, they 
lead instead to undeclared labor (EC, as cited in Constant, 2011, p. 11). 
As seen above, welfare migration has become a serious public concern since the 2004 
enlargement. Yet it is unclear whether or not welfare actually is a determinant of migration in 
the EU/EEA. Based on the findings from the EC commissioned report from 2013, one could 
draw the conclusion that notions of welfare migration within the EU/EEA are based on faulty 
assumptions about reality (i.e. about migrants’ motivation) rather than empirical facts. This 
would, however, be a controversial conclusion. Why this is, will be shown in the following 
literature review. 
1.2 Literature Review 
In an attempt to discover whether or not generous welfare provisions attract migrants within 
the EU/EEA, a review of the existing literature seems pertinent. Determining the current 
status of knowledge is relevant for the thesis’ analysis, as it will provide background 
information that will aid the interpretation of the different perceptions of welfare migration. 
  
                                                 
6
 The transitional arrangements were based on the so-called ”2+3+2” formula, whereby different 
conditions applied to each phase following the accession (European Commission, as cited in Constant, 
2011).  
7
 Immigrants who wished to work in the UK had to register with the Home Office administered 
Worker Registration Scheme within a month of joining a new employer. By registering, immigrants 
were able to claim some basic benefits depending on previous employment. This temporary measure 
lasted until 2011.  
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1.2.1 The Welfare Magnet Hypothesis 
The “welfare magnet hypothesis” was coined by Borjas in his influential 1999 paper 
Immigration and Welfare Magnets (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012, p. 8). In this paper, he 
suggests that: 
It is possible … that welfare programs attract immigrants who otherwise would not 
have migrated to the United States; or that the safety net discourages immigrants who 
“fail” in the United States from returning to their source countries; or that the huge 
interstate dispersion in welfare benefits affects the residential location choices of 
immigrants in the United States and places a heavy fiscal burden on relatively 
generous states.  
(Borjas, 1999, p. 608) 
Taken out of a strictly U.S. context, the hypothesis indicates that “immigrants prefer to locate 
in countries with generous welfare provisions to insure themselves against labor market risks” 
(Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 8). Because immigrants are a self-selected sample of persons 
who have already chosen to bear the fixed costs of a geographical move, selecting one state 
over another has little additional costs. Exhibiting income-maximizing behavior, welfare 
recipients among newly arrived immigrants “should be clustered in the states that offer the 
highest welfare benefits” (Borjas, 1999, pp. 608–609). 
As for the composition of (potential) immigrants, Giulietti and Wahba (2012, p. 8) argue that 
“this effect may not be necessarily limited to unskilled immigrants, since also high-skilled 
immigrants may prefer to live in countries with larger social benefit systems”. However, 
Brücker et al. (as cited in Giulietti, Guzi, Kahenec & Zimmermann, 2011, p. 3) find that 
countries with generous welfare systems attract relatively more low-skilled workers compared 
to countries where social spending, and presumably the tax burden, is lower. Because of this, 
they argue, welfare generosity may induce an unfavorable sorting of immigrants. 
1.2.2 Current Status of Knowledge 
It is not until recently that welfare migration as a topic has generated substantial interest 
among scholars (Giulietti & Wahba 2012, p.2). The recent academic interest in Europe is 
undoubtedly due to the increase in popular concern regarding the role of welfare in attracting 
migrants, sparked by the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. Reviewing a number of recent 
empirical studies, among which a large number of papers that explore the welfare magnet 
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hypothesis within the context of the EU, Giulietti and Wahba (2012, abstract) find that 
“Although economic theory predicts that welfare generosity affects the number, composition 
and location of immigrants, the empirical evidence is rather mixed”. 
Several studies have addressed the hypothesis by examining whether immigrants are more 
likely than natives to be welfare recipients (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 10). Analyzing the 
UK, where immigrants from new member states were subject to certain restrictions with 
regard to welfare access, Blanchflower and Lawton (2009, p. 188) find that between May 
2004 and June 2008, “Only relatively small numbers of EU108 nationals have obtained state 
benefits such as Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance”. Interpreting these numbers, the 
authors claim that the immigrants “came to work and not to claim benefits”. At the same time, 
they report that “over 111,000 EU10 nationals have received Child Benefit”, for which 
entitlement is not dependent on income or employment status. Looking at post-2004 
immigration from the new member states to Ireland and Sweden, Kahenec et al. (2010, p. 30) 
find that in the case of Ireland, there is no evidence of “welfare tourism”. The evidence from 
Sweden is more mixed, with immigrants being “slightly overrepresented in social 
assistance, but underrepresented in other income transfer programs“. In an EU 
commissioned report, Zimmermann, Kahenec, Giulietti, Guzi, Barrett and Maître (2012) find 
that when controlling for socio-economic characteristics such as age, education and family 
composition, welfare dependency persists only in seven member states. Moreover, the results 
are statistically insignificant and the causal effect from social welfare spending to 
immigration is found to be very weak. This leads the authors to reject the welfare magnet 
hypothesis (Zimmermann et al., 2012, p. vi). 
These studies all use the welfare dependency of immigrants as a measure to test the welfare 
magnet hypothesis. However, as Giulietti and Wahba (2012, p. 13) point out, examining the 
gap in welfare dependency between immigrants and natives might not be the best way to test 
the welfare magnet hypothesis as “immigrants’ excess welfare use does not necessarily imply 
that generous welfare states attract immigrants”. Studies that focus on the locational choices 
of migrants arguably yield more credible results. One such study comes from Pedersen, 
Pytlikova and Smith (2008), who examine immigration flows into the OECD countries 
between 1990 and 2000. Testing the welfare magnet hypothesis by using public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a measure of welfare generosity, their results indicate 
                                                 
8
 EU10 refers to the ten countries that entered the EU in 2004.  
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that there is no clear evidence that public social expenditures have had a major influence on 
migration patterns. Although the effect of public social spending is statistically insignificant, 
their results do indicate the existence of a U-shaped effect, where the effect is bigger for the 
poorest and richest source countries (Pedersen et al., 2008, p. 1180). 
Warin and Svaton (2008) similarly estimate the welfare state effect by looking at total social 
protection expenditure per capita in purchasing power parity standards. Unlike Pedersen et al., 
however, they do find that the welfare state, in combination with other economic, network, 
geospatial and linguistic effects, plays a role in explaining migration flows into the EU-15. 
This leads them to conclude that “The crucial finding that the level of social protection 
expenditure sends an important signal to potential immigrants lends considerable support for 
the welfare state magnets hypothesis in the European context” (Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 26). 
They do however emphasize that 
…there exists an offsetting mechanism between the unemployment rate and social 
protection expenditure in the host country with respect to attracting immigrants, but 
the negative effect of the unemployment rate seems to be disproportionately more 
important than the positive effect of social protection expenditure in attracting 
migrants to the host country.  
(Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 23) 
Examining migration flows from the new member states into the EU-15, De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari (2009) use the net replacement rate
9
 as a measure of welfare generosity. While their 
findings suggest that “the generosity of the welfare state may act as a migration magnet across 
the countries of the European Union”, they too find that compared to the role of labor market 
conditions, such as the unemployment rate and the level of wages, “the size of these welfare 
magnets is relatively low” (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009, p. 361). Conversely, using 
unemployment benefit spending (UBS) as a proxy for welfare generosity, Giulietti et al. 
(2011, abstract) find that “All estimates for immigrants from EU origins indicate that flows 
within the EU are not related to unemployment benefit generosity. This suggests that the so-
called ‘welfare migration’ debate is misguided and not based on empirical evidence”. 
                                                 
9
 The net replacement is “the ratio between income out of work – i.e. from welfare benefits – and 
income in work – i.e. some measure of the average wage”, and is used to measure welfare generosity 
(De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009, p. 355). 
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The preceding review of literature supports Giulietti and Wahba’s (2012, p. 15) conclusion 
that the empirical evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis is mixed, and that “when 
evidence of a magnet effect is found, the impact tends to be rather exiguous”. They offer two 
potential explanations for the mixed empirical findings: the possibility of reverse causality 
between welfare spending and immigration and the existence of different migration regimes 
(Giulietti and Wahba, 2012, p. 14). The latter explanation is particularly relevant for this 
thesis, as the EU is a so-called free-migration regime.  
In their study, Razin and Wahba (2001) distinguishes free-migration from policy-controlled 
migration regimes. In a free-migration regime, such as the EU, the impact of welfare 
generosity is expected to be negative on the skill composition of migrants (as the welfare state 
attracts unskilled migrants who are likely to be net beneficiaries of the welfare state), while 
the impact will be positive in a restricted mobility regime (since voters will prefer selective 
migration policies that favor skilled migrants who tend to be net contributors to the fiscal 
system). Comparing a free-migration regime with a policy-controlled regime, represented by 
migration within the EU, Norway and Switzerland and migration from outside of the EU 
respectively, Razin and Wahba (2011, p. 30) find strong support for the welfare magnet 
hypothesis under the free migration regime and strong support for the so-called “fiscal burden 
hypothesis” under the policy-controlled regime. 
To summarize, the literature does not provide a crystal clear answer to the question of 
whether welfare generosity functions as a magnet on migrants. Several of the more recent 
(and arguably more reliable) studies focusing on intra-EU migration do however lend some 
support for the welfare magnet hypothesis. For this reason, the tentative conclusion drawn 
here is that welfare generosity does have a slight effect on European migrants’ locational 
choices, but this effect is negligible when compared with the effect of unemployment rates 
and wage levels. Having established a baseline for the interpretation and understanding of 
existing perceptions of welfare migration, the next section addresses the thesis’ research 
question and sets its scope. 
1.3 Objectives and Research Question 
As the literature review above shows, much research has been done in an attempt to discover 
whether or not welfare generosity is a determinant of migration into the EU-15. There has, 
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however, been little research on what constitutes different perceptions of welfare migration, 
and how these perceptions are expressed. Perceptions or ideas are interesting because they can 
help us understand political actors and their decisions (Bratberg, 2014, p. 57). Regardless of 
the empirical evidence then, which at present is both unclear and conflicting, perceptions of 
welfare migration have the potential to influence policy – and are therefore well worth 
investigating. In an attempt to bring something new to the scientific debate on welfare 
migration, this thesis will investigate perceptions of welfare migration among political parties 
in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. 
The primary objective of the thesis is to investigate how different perceptions of welfare 
migration manifest themselves in the party platforms of the Scandinavian parties currently 
represented in parliament. Because the study also wishes to say something about welfare 
migration within the bigger discussion on European integration, the research question is 
twofold: 
Which perceptions of welfare migration, within the context of the EU/EEA, exist and 
dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark? And do these 
perceptions reflect a nation-based, a federal, or a cosmopolitan view of the EU? 
To examine what constitutes different perceptions of welfare migration, the thesis will make 
use of qualitative content analysis. Three models of the EU as a democratic polity, created on 
the basis of EU citizenship theory, will provide the analytical framework through which the 
perceptions will be captured and filtered. Mapping which actors subscribe to which 
perceptions will provide the necessary grounds for comparison, both across and within each 
of the countries.  
1.4 Case Selection 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark have been chosen for comparison because they are countries 
that are similar on a number of different variables. All three countries have parliamentary 
multi-party systems with roughly the same number of parties represented in parliament. 
Moreover, the three countries are all relatively small and ethnically homogenous states, and 
they share a common political culture that takes the form of the Scandinavian welfare state 
(Hansen, 2002, p. 11). The Nordic welfare state (or the Nordic model) is described as 
extensive in terms of the kind of social needs it seeks to meet, as institutionalized in that it 
10 
 
offers all legal citizens – through social rights – a decent standard of living, and as universal 
in that welfare policies have been aimed at the whole population as opposed to particularly 
vulnerable groups (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, as cited in Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010, p. 
23). Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 69–77) shows that the Scandinavian countries cluster 
together around socialist regime attributes, and argues that universalism is the reigning 
principle in social democratic welfare states.  
Also relevant for this thesis, are the immigration and integration policies that have been and 
are being pursued in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. While the three countries’ policies were 
quite similar until the 1980s (to a large extent because of the influence of Sweden as a pioneer 
in the policy area), this has changed in the last few decades. Public debates in Denmark have 
in recent years taken on a harder tone, with more immigrant critical viewpoints being voiced. 
Danish policies have also become more restrictive, both in terms of immigration control and 
social policy. Some of the same developments can be seen in public debates in Norway, 
although to a lesser degree. Changes in immigration legislation and social rights have also 
been less pronounced than in Denmark. In Sweden, on the other hand, public debates are 
much more muted. Sweden has also been more careful in terms of tightening immigration 
policies significantly (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010, pp. 29–30). With regards to citizenship, 
there has been a high degree of harmonization between the three countries in terms of the 
principles by which citizenship is granted (Ersbøll, as cited in Olsen, 2014, p. 136). The three 
countries have likewise had similar policies in terms of political rights given to non-citizens 
(Olsen, 2014, p. 136). 
Although the three Scandinavian countries are similar in many respects, they differ in terms 
of their form of affiliation with the EU. Norway is integrated in the EU and the internal 
market through the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement was signed by the Norwegian 
prime minister in 1994, after the Norwegian people had voted no to full EU membership in a 
plebiscite the same year. The Norwegian people also voted no to joining the European 
Community (later to become the EU) in a plebiscite in 1972, when Denmark voted yes. 
Denmark does, however, hold several important opt-outs from the EU in the policy areas 
citizenship, police and justice, common security and defense policy (CSDP), and economic 
and monetary union (EMU). These opt-outs were secured in the Edinburgh Agreement of 
1992, after a referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (which upon its entry 
created the EU) was rejected by Danish voters in 1992. Sweden did not apply for membership 
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of the European Community in 1972, but joined the newly created EU in 1994. Sweden is the 
most fully integrated member of the three countries, with the only opt-out being from the 
Eurozone. 
The comparative design flowing from this case selection allows for an investigation into the 
role the form of affiliation with the EU has on perceptions of welfare migration. Because the 
cases are similar on a number of dimensions, but differ on the EU dimension, any significant 
national differences in how welfare migration can arguably be accounted for by form of 
affiliation. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents and discusses the analytical framework 
that has been chosen in order to investigate which perceptions of welfare migration exist and 
dominate among political parties in Scandinavia. While the first part of the chapter is 
concerned with the thesis’ theoretical approach, including EU citizenship theory and the 
analytical framework, the second part of the chapter deals with the methodological approach 
of the thesis, including method, research design and data. In chapter 3, the analysis is 
conducted and the findings discussed. Chapter 4 concludes the thesis, discusses implications 
of the findings, and deliberates on potential avenues of future research.        
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2 Analytical Framework 
This chapter presents and discusses the analytical framework that has been chosen in order to 
answer the research question, namely which perceptions of welfare migration exist and 
dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Because the EU/EEA is 
the larger context in which European welfare migration is discussed, EU citizenship theory 
provides the theoretical backdrop against which perceptions of welfare migration are 
examined. EU citizenship challenges the traditional understanding of citizenship as something 
that is primarily linked to the state and the nation (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 2013, p. 
505; Preuss, Everson, Koenig-Archibugi & Lefebvre, 2003, p. 4). Accordingly, the EU (and 
any potential developments in the direction of a supranational polity) challenges European 
nation-states, as the individual states are no longer in complete control over their 
communities.  
The discussion on welfare migration is a manifestation of the challenge that the EU and EU 
citizenship pose to national citizenship, national institutions and national sovereignty. Intra-
EU migration challenges national perceptions of political community and citizenship because 
citizens of other EU/EEA countries – through EU citizenship – have the right to move and 
reside freely in the EU. Moreover, with the introduction of EU citizenship, any discrimination 
on the basis of nationality has been prohibited (EU, 2010, pp. 56–57). In order to uncover and 
understand the different perceptions of welfare migration, this study makes use of three 
different models of the EU, envisioning the EU as a nation-based, a multinational federal and 
a cosmopolitan polity respectively. The method used is qualitative content analysis, more 
specifically textual idea analysis. Because idea analysis is well suited for mapping ideas in 
text and for extracting and filtering them according to the context in which they occur, it is 
considered the proper method for answering the research question posed in this thesis.  
While EU citizenship theory is the subject of the first part of the chapter, idea analysis is the 
subject of the second. Before concluding the chapter, research design and data will be 
discussed. 
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2.1 Theoretical Approach 
As mentioned above, this thesis makes use of a nation-based, a multinational federal and a 
cosmopolitan model of the EU to investigate which perceptions of welfare migration exist and 
dominate among political parties in Scandinavia. These models are based on EU citizenship 
theory, which touches upon several aspects that are central to the discussion on European 
welfare migration. Freedom of movement is at the core of this discussion. EU citizens’ right 
to move and reside freely ensures that the threshold to relocate is low, and has consequently 
been central to the concerns for welfare migration that have been voiced since the 2004 
enlargement. Welfare migration is a worry not only because of the large socio-economic 
differences between the “old” and the “new” member states, but also because the social 
dimension of the EU has not been developed at the same speed as the economic dimension – 
and social benefit schemes vary greatly from member state to member state. This deficiency 
in terms of social cohesion, in combination with freedom of movement, has been seen not 
only as a threat to the welfare state, but as a threat to the EU as a political and social 
community. As will be seen in the following, most scholars believe that ameliorating this 
situation is critical for the future development of EU citizenship. In addition, it is believed 
that a certain amount of community feeling is necessary to secure the success of future 
European integration. 
The three models of the EU that provides the framework for next chapter’s analysis are three 
different visions of what the EU as a democratic polity should look like. These models 
embody some of the most common opinions and beliefs about the viability of EU citizenship 
and the potential opportunities and challenges it presents for the future of European 
integration. For this reason, some of the main theoretical streams of the vast EU citizenship 
literature is presented and discussed before the three models are laid out. Before embarking 
on EU citizenship theory, however, it is necessary to define citizenship, as this is a contested 
concept in political theory. For analytical purposes, citizenship will be broken down into two 
main dimensions that will provide the building blocks for the three models. These dimensions 
will also aid the dissection of the perceptions of welfare migration found in the analysis.  
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2.1.1 Defining Citizenship 
In this thesis, citizenship is broadly defined as a legal status that entails certain rights and that 
links an individual to a political entity, as well as a source of identity that creates feelings of 
belonging with the community of the political entity. In political theory, however, citizenship 
is a contested concept (Isin, 2002; Miller, 2000, p. 82; Preuss et al., 2003; Tilly 2005, pp. 
197–198). There are, however, certain fundamental components of citizenship that most 
definitions encompass (whether explicitly or implicitly). In addition to being a legal status 
establishing membership and entailing certain rights (and sometimes duties), citizenship also 
provides members of a community with an identity and a sense of belonging.   
Traditionally, conceptions of citizenship have been closely connected with those of state and 
nation (Bauböck 2007, p. 454; Preuss et al., 2003, p. 4, 6). While the concept of state is linked 
to formal membership, the concept of nation is linked to a specific type of identity. Preuss et 
al. argues that 
State-building meant the creation of a unified, legally homogenized and 
bureaucratically controlled territory, the gradual transformation of a segmented set of 
dissociated individuals… into the corporate unity of culturally and legally 
standardized subjects whose loyalty was forcefully directed, and…the 
institutionalization of one supreme and exclusive force within the boundaries of that 
territory – sovereignty.  
(Preuss et al., 2003, p. 4) 
Brubaker (1992, p. 21) defines modern citizenry to coincide roughly with a state’s permanent 
resident population, from which foreigners and stateless persons are excluded. Citizenship, he 
contends, is internally inclusive and externally exclusive. Despite using residency in defining 
citizenry, Brubaker argues that the modern state is more than a mere territorial organization. It 
is also a membership organization, an association of citizens: 
The state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular, bounded citizenry; it claims 
legitimacy by claiming to express the will and further the interest of that citizenry. 
This bounded citizenry is usually conceived as a nation – as something more cohesive 
than a mere aggregate of persons who happen legally to belong to the state.   
(Brubaker, 1992, p. 21) 
Discussing nation-building, Rokkan (1999, p. 170) highlights the development of standard 
languages as a step in the process of territory-building in Europe. Reaffirming the territorial 
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identity of the state was thought to be easier if there was one common language within the 
territory. While any language could transmit what Rokkan describes as the lore of the land, 
“the symbolism they were intended to convey would be much stronger if language and state 
were coterminous” (Rokkan, 1999, p. 170).  
The foregoing conceptions of citizenship can be placed within the classical Westphalian 
model of citizenship, in which citizenship rights are ineradicably fixed to territory and 
nationality (Shore, 2004, p. 29). This model is obvious in Bodin’s writings on the nexus 
between citizenship, territoriality and sovereignty, in which he stresses four dimensions: 
first, only one sovereign poser can exercise legitimate rule within a territory; second, 
no person can be the subject of more than one sovereign; third, all citizens have the 
same legal status and stand in exactly the same relationship with the sovereign; and 
fourth, the ties that bind the citizen and sovereign totally exclude aliens.  
(Bodin, as cited in Linklater, 1998b, p. 200) 
Summing up the Westphalian model with an equation, Balibar (as cited in Shore, 2004, p. 41) 
argues that [nationality = citizenship] = sovereignty. 
More recent conceptions of citizenship focus less on state and nation and more on the 
relations between citizens and the agents of a given political entity (i.e. on rights and 
participation). Tilly (2005, p. 173) regards citizenship as an organized set of social ties; rights 
and obligations bind people who are legally recognized by a state with agents of that state. 
Because categories of persons are related to agents of government through a set of mutually 
enforceable claims, Tilly (2005, p. 193) holds that citizenship has the character of a contract: 
…variable in range, never completely specified, always depending on unstated 
assumptions about context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, 
yet ineluctably involving rights and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is 
likely to express indignation and take corrective action when the other fails to meet 
expectations built into the relationship. 
Similarly, Olsen (2013, p. 508) describes citizenship as a phenomenon “which is created, 
activated and transformed in specific institutional practices”. Citizenship does not only tie 
individuals to a specific political unit; it is also always bestowed upon individuals by specific 
institutions, and affected in its scope by political practices. 
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Preuss et al. (2003, p. 7) stress that although nationality is widely regarded as synonymous 
with citizenship, there is a conceptual difference between the two terms. Historically, 
nationality was a position of passive submission, a status given to subjects of the state. 
Citizenship, on the other hand, was an active status given only to a small share of the 
nationals, who were given the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the polity. Because 
citizenship has become increasingly inclusive over the course of the last few centuries, and 
most adults today enjoy the status of citizenship, the two concepts have conflated in modern 
usage. Yet, Preuss et al. (2003, p. 7) argue, the concepts of nationality and citizenship serve 
different functions: 
Nationality is the legal concept that defines the legal membership of an individual of a 
state. It is the starting point for citizenship, but it is not citizenship itself. Citizenship is 
the status that encompasses the rights, duties, benefits and burdens that follow from a 
person’s nationality. Hence, to be the national of a particular state means to be its 
citizen. But it is less clear what it means to be its citizen, since the amount and the 
character of the rights, duties, benefits and burdens associated with this status are not 
determined by the laws on nationality. 
The above discussion shows that different aspects of citizenship are emphasized in different 
conceptions of citizenship. In order to better be able to understand the various conceptions of 
citizenship as expressed in the literature, this thesis makes use of two analytical dimensions of 
citizenship. These are presented in the following.   
Dimensions of Citizenship 
Analytically, citizenship can be broken down into two basic dimensions: citizenship as a legal 
status and citizenship as belonging. These two dimensions are analytically individual, but 
theoretically interrelated.  
Citizenship as a legal status relates to formal membership in the community (determined by 
what type of criteria are used when granting nationality). More important for this thesis, 
however, are the rights – the entitlements – that derive from the status of citizenship. Citizens 
enjoy a number of rights that non-citizens do not, and these rights are fixed to citizenship 
through the status as a member of a political unit. Today, citizen rights are usually conferred 
upon individuals by virtue of their status as nationals of the given state (see the above 
discussion of Preuss et al., 2003). Following from the status as citizenship is also the right to 
participate: “citizenship has expressed a right to being political, a right to constitute oneself as 
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an agent to govern and be governed, deliberate with others, and enjoin determining the fate of 
the polity to which one belongs” (Isin, 2002, p. 1). Operationally, one must look at the 
extension of rights, on whom they are bestowed, and the degree to which they are exclusive 
(Olsen, 2008, p. 44; Olsen, 2013, p. 509). 
Citizenship as belonging relates to the informal aspect of membership in a community. It can 
be described as an identity that provides members with a sense of belonging, and says 
something about who belongs and who does not. The key question is how the community is 
built up, what its constitutive parts are, and how it is different from other communities (Olsen, 
2008, p. 43). As underlined by Isin (2002, p. 22, 29), social groups are formed in relation to 
other groups and not isolation from them. This, then, determines how a given community 
constitutes itself, how it differentiates itself from other communities, and how citizenship as a 
group identity is defined. Operationally, identity can be investigated by looking at what 
notions bind a community of citizens together, how membership is framed in terms of 
belonging, and which characteristics are used to separate us from them. 
As will be seen in the following discussion on EU citizenship, how these dimensions are 
construed, and which aspects of the dimensions are emphasized, varies with different 
conceptions of citizenship. 
2.1.2 EU Citizenship 
Citizenship of the European Union was introduced by the Maastrich Treaty in 1992, and 
entered into force on 1 November 2003. Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)
10
 establishes that “any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall 
be prohibited”. In addition, according to articles 20–25, citizens of the EU shall enjoy a 
number of rights, including:  
 The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
 The right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament (EP) 
and in local elections in their member state of residence 
 The right to be protected by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any member state 
                                                 
10
 2010 consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome (1957).  
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 The right to petition the EP, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address any 
of the EU institutions  
EU citizenship is given to every person who is a national of a member state. The TFEU 
clearly states that EU citizenship is additional to, and does not replace, national citizenship 
(EU, 2010, p. 56–58). As pointed out by Shaw (1997, p. 2), this refers back to a provision of 
the Maastricht Treaty
11
 which states that “The Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy” 
(EU, 1992, p. 9)
12
. Because it is in effect the member states that decide who can and cannot 
become citizens of the EU, Bauböck (as cited in Preuss et al., 2003, p. 5) comments that “the 
dogma of state sovereignty in determining nationality remains unchallenged”. 
While being a supranational innovation, EU citizenship has been criticized for adding little to 
the already existing rights that can be found in the treaties. For this reason, its introduction 
was “regarded in some quarters as a false prospectus” (Jacobs, 2007, p. 592).  Along the same 
line, Follesdal (2001a, pp. 314–315) describes EU citizenship’s content as “anemic”. Because 
Europeans already enjoy a wide range of civil, political and social rights, he contends, the 
function of EU citizenship remains unclear and contested. Regardless of being regarded as 
merely a “token citizenship” and an attempt at building a European identity, Delanty (2007, p. 
66) argues that the introduction of the EU citizenship put the Union “on the road to a 
constitutional polity as opposed to an intergovernmental organization based on states”. 
Moreover, he contends that because EU citizenship for the first time “defined the EU in terms 
of a relation to the individual citizen”, it was a momentous departure from the integration 
model that had been in use since the Treaty of Rome (Delanty, 2007, p. 66). 
Preuss et al. (2003, pp. 4–5) point to the fact that the EU lacks the essential properties of a 
state: First, the EU territory is not unified, but defined by the territoriality of the member 
states. Second, there is no unified body of subjects since citizens are tied primarily to the 
individual member states and their respective institutions. Third, the EU does not have 
                                                 
11
 Originally Article F of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the wording of this provision has been 
changed in the 2010 consolidated versions of the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Now found in Article 4 (2) of the TEU and the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, there is 
no longer any reference to the member states being founded on democratic principles, but rather that 
the Union is.  
12
 While EU citizenship being additional to national citizenship might refer back to this provision of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the relationship of the EU citizenship vis-à-vis national Member State 
citizenship was not clarified until the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Follesdal, 2001b, p. 233).  
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sovereignty as its authority derives from the member states’ transferal of competencies 
through the various treaties. Yet, Preuss et al. argues, the EU has transcended the limited 
character of alliances and confederations: 
…the EU is now a political entity enjoying a substantial degree of autonomy in 
devising policies and implementing them through the use of regulative powers 
characteristic of statehood. Most remarkable is the development of a distinct legal 
order of the European Community, which includes highly institutionalized mechanisms 
of law-making, the direct effect of its law on the member states (with regard to both 
their state organs and their citizens), and the superiority of its law over member state 
law in the case of collision – even vis-à-vis conflicting constitutional law.  
(Preuss et al., 2003, p. 5) 
EU citizenship challenges the traditional understanding of citizenship as something that is 
intrinsically linked with state and nation (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 2013, p. 505; Preuss 
et al., 2003, p. 4). Because the EU is more than an intergovernmental organization, it poses a 
challenge to the member states’ sovereignty, as they are no longer in complete control over 
their communities. With the introduction of EU citizenship, certain supranational rights were 
also afforded all EU citizens, among them the right to move and reside freely within the EU 
and the right of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. These supranational rights 
challenge national citizenship and national institutions such as national welfare schemes – as 
the individual states are no longer free to determine who has access to them.  
While some see the extension of citizenship beyond the state as something that could 
potentially have radical implications for the meaning of democracy, others argue that there 
can be no meaningful citizenship, and therefore no democracy, without the nation-state. The 
following section presents the main streams of EU citizenship literature. 
2.1.3 Dominant Streams in EU Citizenship Theory 
As mentioned in the introduction, the bulk of literature on EU citizenship has focused on the 
potential opportunities and challenges it presents for future European integration. Discussions 
about EU citizenship are ultimately linked to what kind of European society, what kind of EU 
polity, the author deems to be practicable – and desirable. The three streams presented here 
embody the most common opinions on the subject and are reflected in the models that will 
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serve as the analytical framework for the analysis. The three models will be presented in the 
subsequent section of the chapter. 
EU citizenship literature can first and foremost be divided into two main streams. One 
envisages EU citizenship as the door opener for a post-national European polity, the other 
points to implications and limitations of EU citizenship within the framework of the EU 
treaties, and the fact that there is no unified European people. A third, more empirically 
oriented stream, focuses on Europeanization and the degree to which EU norms and policies 
have been and are impacting national citizenship institutions (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 
2013, p. 507). 
Post-nationalists 
In the words of Shore (2004, p. 30), advocates of EU citizenship consider it to be a 
“democratic development with far-reaching implications that could put the integration project 
onto a totally new constitutional footing: the beginnings of a more direct relationship between 
the Union and its people”. This statement holds true for Gerstenberg (2001, p. 299), who 
holds that there are current trends in Europe related to globalization and privatization that 
point toward the release of the ideas of citizenship and democracy from concepts such as 
territorial sovereignty and nationality; Europe is on the verge of a constitutional moment, and 
this process will change not only the institutional landscape, but also the very idea of 
democratic constitutionalism. 
This process of de-nationalization does not have to mean a primacy of markets over politics; 
it does not have to be true that “the economic rights and liberties of the market citizen – 
property, tort and contract – are the true constitution of the EU” (Mestmäcker, as cited in 
Gerstenberg, 2001, p. 303).  Nor does de-nationalization have to mean that revitalization of 
the nation-state is the only viable option for social solidarity and democracy. Gerstenberg 
argues that deliberative and direct democracy can be liberated from the limitations imposed 
upon it by the presupposed connection to territoriality and nationality, and that the 
pluralization and extension of democracy to new post-national contexts is not only possible 
through the development of new forms of democratic governance, but also desirable: “By 
creating and fostering those communicative environments which are required by radical 
democracy in the form of a post-national deliberative polyarchy, European law could 
gradually bootstrap itself to legitimacy” (Gerstenberg, 2001, p. 321).  
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Linklater (1998a) agrees that cosmopolitan citizenship would necessitate the establishment of 
international public spheres of dialogue and consent. Through communities of discourse, 
Linklater (1998a, p. 37) contends that this type of citizenship can contribute to the relief of 
certain tensions inherent in modern states, such as the tension between duties toward fellow 
nationals and duties toward the rest of humanity. As for the “unique experiment in 
international cooperation” that is the EU, Linklater (1998a, p. 33) argues that the creation of 
transnational institutions securing legal, political, social and cultural rights would indeed be a 
major exercise in implementing the ideals of a dialogical conception of world citizenship. 
While there might for now be a democratic deficit in the EU, he argues that states are 
engaging in discussions about new forms of citizenship and post-national democracy as a 
consequence of globalization: 
Erosions of sovereignty have yet to be accompanied by the radical alternation of 
traditional assumptions about citizenship. Even so, by virtue of their commitments to 
constitutional democracy, states are increasingly drawn into discussions about how 
the achievements of national citizenship can be retained and consolidated as the logics 
of globalization transform modern political life.  
(Linklater, 1998b, p. 198) 
Habermas (2001, pp. 111) states that governing elites will have to exert influence on their 
national constituents in order to preserve social standards and redress social inequities in a 
post-national constellation. Habermas makes a particular reference to the political parties in 
the EU member states: 
Within the national sphere – the only one they can currently operate in – they have to 
reach out toward a European arena of action. And this arena, in turn, has to be 
programmatically opened up with the dual objective of creating a social Europe that 
can throw its weight onto the cosmopolitan scale.  
(Habermas, 2001, p. 112) 
Dobson (2007, p. 137) proposes that the EU should be regarded as a community of rights, a 
community made up of “reasonable composite selves interconnected by mutuality of respect 
and recognition”. She argues that the development of a consequential EU citizenship is 
possible without supplanting already existing political affiliations, and without trying to 
invoke historical or socio-biological notions of “European-ness”. Dobson (2007, pp. 149–
150) states that EU-level affect, like all notions of community above the local level (including 
national-level affect), is a mental construct. As such, it can be created. Acceding that such 
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political constructs mold the real world and are in all likelihood necessary to a free politics, 
she nevertheless contends that an EU-level affect does not have to be as comprehensive as 
national-level affect. EU institutions and policies, and the social interaction they lead to, can 
result in feelings of mutual respect and recognition: 
Common institutions and policies can focus awareness of the extent to which one’s 
interests are bound up with the interests of larger groups, and supporting and making 
use of its institutions and policies will lead to agents’ acknowledgement that they 
share in both the burdens and the benefits of the polity. The repeating experience of 
successful cooperation between agents creates social bonds conducing to further 
cooperativeness and the formation of communal trust.  
(Gewirth, as cited in Dobson, 2007, p. 150) 
Such factors, Dobson (2007, p. 150) points out, have been an integral part of the process 
through which people have come to identify themselves as members of a given community, 
be it a national or another type of community. 
The post-nationalists release the concept of citizenship (and democracy) from concepts such 
as state and nation. They argue that deliberation and new, supranational forms of democratic 
governance are the keys to success for post-national polities. For the post-nationalists, the 
citizenship aspects of rights and participation are much more important than a shared identity 
and physical belonging.  
No-demos Theorists 
Many scholars have focused on the nation-aspect and the fact that there is no single European 
people, the so-called no-demos thesis. According to this thesis, democracy requires that a 
community of people identify themselves as a demos (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 81). For this to 
happen, certain prior conditions have to exist. Different authors give different meanings to 
what these necessary conditions consist of, examples being a common language, history, or 
common political culture (Grimm, 1995; Miller, 1995; Shore, 2004). The absence of such 
prior conditions is seen to impede democracy because where there is no demos, there can be 
no democracy – and consequently no “genuine” citizenship beyond the nation-state (Miller, 
1995; Olsen, 2013, p. 507). Since there is no one European people, then, but rather several 
separate national demoi, “democracy at the European level is a fruitless pursuit” (Nicolaidis, 
2004, p. 81). 
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Miller (1995, p. 165) claims that national identities provide people with the kind of social 
map that they need in order to understand the social world around them. Nationality is 
different from other collective sources of personal identity for a number of reasons: First, its 
members share a belief that they belong together and they are mutually committed to 
continuing their life in common. Second, it is an identity that embodies historical continuity 
and that stretches both backwards into the past and forwards into the future. Third, it is an 
active identity, meaning that the nation becomes what it is through the decisions that it 
collectively makes. Fourth, it is an identity which connects a group of people to a particular 
geographical place. And fifth, it is an identity which requires the people who share it to have a 
common public culture (Miller, 1995, pp. 22–27). The last element of Miller’s conception of 
national identities needs a bit of clarification: Defining public culture as “a set of 
understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together”, Miller (1995, p. 
26) maintains that while they vary from case to case, they will always include political 
principles and social norms, and quite possibly also cultural ideals. Furthermore, while 
common public cultures are necessary prerequisites for national identities, they are not all 
embracing, and they may leave room for sub-cultures to exist within the borders of the nation. 
As for supranational citizenship, Miller (1995, pp. 159–163) grants that perhaps we can look 
forward to more complex nested identities. If the public culture becomes narrowly political 
and takes the form of patriotism to the constitution (so-called “constitutional patriotism”), he 
argues, it would allow for an easy extension of political identity to the European level. It 
would not, however, provide individuals with the kind of identity that nationality does. Only 
by embracing a national identity and the obligations that go along with it that it, he contends, 
is it possible to sustain a society which in turn can provide the conditions under which it is 
possible to pursue “the good life” in security (Miller, 1995, p. 165). Citizen rights and duties, 
then, are placed within the nation-state. 
Grimm’s (1995, pp. 292–299) main argument is that a well-functioning democracy is 
dependent upon the existence of certain intermediary structures within society, structures such 
as political parties, interest groups and communication systems. These structures are 
necessary because governing institutions must be answerable before the people who have 
given them the right to exercise power over them. While seeing the Europeanization of both 
national party systems and interest groups as a possibility, Grimm argues that there are no 
prospects for Europeanization of the communication system because there is no common 
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language in the EU. Because there is as yet a lack of truly European mediatory structures, and 
consequently no European demos, Grimm argues that the transformation of the EU into a 
federal state is undesirable and would only weaken the legitimacy of the Union. 
Like Miller, Shore (2004) focuses on the functions of citizenship as an identity-marker and 
classificatory device. Shore argues that a narrowly public culture based on patriotism to a 
constitution, to law, is unthinkable because rights cannot be meaningfully divorced from 
identity: “the identity-endowing element of citizenship derives precisely from the legal and 
political benefits, rights and duties that citizenship confers upon its members” (Shore, 2004, 
p. 29). EU citizenship, he contends, is an attempt at creating a European demos: 
‘European Citizenship’ exemplifies what anthropologists call a ‘blank banner or 
‘mobilizing metaphor’: a free-floating signifier designed not so much to generate 
support for the EU among its would-be European public, but to invent the category of 
a ‘European public’ in the first place.  
(Shore, 2004, p. 31) 
Furthermore, Shore argues that the creation of an EU citizenship challenges one of the 
fundamental principles of the EU: 
For decades, the goal of the EU, summed up in the Treaty of Rome, has been to ‘lay 
the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Not the 
creation of ‘one people’ but a union of many.  
(Shore, 2004, p. 32) 
Shore (2004, p. 38–40) argues that the attempt to create a European identity through the use 
of nation-building strategies is to undermine the many peoples of the EU, and that the 
establishment of an EU citizenship is premature since there is no European demos. In defense 
of the nation-states, he argues that it is their history and the successive adaptation and 
reformation of their institutions that have allowed them to get close to their citizens and 
winning their consent to be governed. Like Grimm, Shore underlines the importance of 
mediatory societal structures in this process, and point to the lack of such pan-European 
structures. In conclusion, “the EU is simply too large, too diverse and too cumbersome to be 
an effective democratic unit” (Shore, 2004, p. 40).  
The no-demos theorists give great emphasis to nationality and a shared identity in their 
discussion of EU citizenship. Rights, they argue, cannot be separated from identity. 
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Accordingly, they contend that a supranational EU – consisting of many peoples rather than 
one people – is doomed to fail. For the post-nationalists, identity and physical belonging are 
the decisive components in citizenship.  
Europeanization Theorists 
In the more empirically oriented stream of EU citizenship literature, the focus is on 
Europeanization and the degree to which EU norms and policies are impacting national 
citizenship institutions. Jacobs (2007, p. 592) contends that the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has been able to give EU citizenship a more substantial content than what the articles of 
the TFEU explicitly express – a content he suggests is perhaps more substantial than what the 
authors of the Maastricht Treaty originally envisaged (see also Constant, 2006). 
Delanty (2007, p. 66–68) maintains that the introduction of the EU citizenship was a 
momentous departure from the integration model in use since the Treaty of Rome because it 
meant that the EU for the first time defined itself in terms of a relation to the individual 
citizen. According to Delanty, the most important implication of EU citizenship is the fact 
that it is defined in terms of residence rather than birth or descent. While acknowledging the 
critics who point to the fact that passports are still national and limited to citizens of the 
member states, Delanty nonetheless maintains that given the diversity of national policies of 
immigration and naturalization, the introduction of an EU citizenship has meant a loosening 
of the bond between citizenship and nationality. Moreover, it has resulted in increased 
migration between the member states. Consequently, citizenship has become a “contested 
domain in which the state is only one actor” (Delanty, 2007, p. 71). 
Furthermore, Delanty (2007, pp. 67–68) claims that Europeanization of the national context 
through EU legislation is resulting in a gradual process of convergence of citizenship in the 
member states. While arguing that the centrality of rights to the definition of the European 
polity is the striking feature of the Europeanization of citizenship, he does not believe in the 
success of a purely rights-based model. This model has not succeeded, as made evident by the 
constitutional crisis of 2005
13
, because it has not been coupled with the EU citizenship 
tradition of solidarity and social justice (Delanty, 2007, pp. 68–71). Investigating Greek 
                                                 
13
 In 2004, a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was signed by representatives of the 
(then) 25 member states, but failed to be ratified after French and Dutch voters rejected the draft 
constitutional treaty in May and June 2005.  
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practices and policies pertaining to citizenship and minorities, Agnastou (2005, p. 355) 
contends that “While there is little evidence indicating a reconceptualisation of national 
identity”, Europeanization has nonetheless brought about a change in the shape of a 
widespread acceptance among the Greek elite for the liberal view that guarantees equal rights 
for all individuals. Also looking at convergence is Odmalm (2007, p. 30), who argue that 
member states that have traditionally been big receivers of immigrants – but that are now 
having reservations about further immigration – are putting pressure on more liberal states to 
adjust their policies because of a fear of becoming “final destination” countries. He contends 
that it is with regard to the inclusion of certain integration requirements demanding that 
immigrants show a willingness to assimilate, that the most significant degree of 
harmonization is taking place. This is happening, he argues, because “the relationship 
between the ‘nation state’ is still strong while the link between ‘EU’ and ‘citizenship’ is still 
weak”. 
Not all authors find evidence of convergence, however. Investigating German debates over 
citizenship and membership, Checkel (2001, pp. 196–197) argues that Europeanization 
(defined as “the development of new collective understandings on citizenship and 
membership at the European level”) of nationality or citizenship is emergent at best. 
Investigating the Netherlands, Vink (2001) finds that Europeanization of citizenship is limited 
by strong and reticent national institutions, and contends that “There is…no binding EU 
legislation on citizenship policy because EU Member States strongly oppose any Community 
action in this respect” (Vink, 2001, p. 878). He does, however, mention several cases in which 
rulings by the European Court of Justice have affected member states’ citizenship policies and 
indeed have affirmed that domestic citizenship policy falls within the scope of Community 
law (Vink, 2001, pp. 884–885, 892). With this in mind, Vink does not rule out the possibility 
of stronger EU involvement in domestic citizenship policies in the future. 
While the post-nationalists and the no-demos theorists, sometimes referred to as visionaries 
and skeptics (see Bauböck 2007), engage in theoretical discussions on the viability of EU 
citizenship, the Europeanization theorists are more concerned with examining empirical data 
and establishing how EU norms and policies are affecting national citizenship institutions. On 
a conceptual level, that is also the aim of this thesis, as the discussion on welfare migration 
can be seen as a symptom of the EU’s introduction of an EU citizenship, securing the right to 
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move and reside freely within the EU. The next section presents the three models of the EU 
that provides the analytical framework for the analysis.  
2.1.4 Models of the EU 
In approaching the empirical analysis, this study will make use of three different models of 
the EU as a democratic polity. The three models are based on Olsen (2013, pp. 509–510) and 
envision the EU as a nation-based, a federal, and a cosmopolitan polity respectively. These 
models provide the analytical framework for the analysis, and have been chosen because they 
express different views on the dimensions of citizenship. Being clearly distinguishable from 
one another, they will allow for a well-defined and transparent process of identifying and 
filtering perceptions of welfare migration in the analysis. 
While many opinions expressed by the no-demos theorists can be found in the nation-based 
model, the cosmopolitan model embodies many of the post-nationalist sentiments. The 
multinational federal model finds its followers in different theoretical camps. 
The Nation-based Model 
Basic Principles: National Identity & Intergovernmentalism 
In this model, the EU would be rearranged so that ultimate and final arbitration rests with the 
member states. They would retain veto power on all issues considered significant for their 
continued political autonomy, and the reach of European integration would consequently be 
limited. The institutional system in this model would be strictly intergovernmental, as the 
member states would be the supreme “masters of the Treaties” 14. It follows that the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union would be secured at the national level of the member 
states. The nation-based model fosters what Olsen (2013, p. 509) describes as “audit 
democracy” – a system in which important decisions may be made at supranational level, but 
where the constituent nation-states nevertheless have every opportunity of reviewing them. As 
for citizenship, the member states would be in complete control with regards to the 
designation of citizenship and with regards to setting the scope of rights and duties – at EU 
and at national level (Olsen, 2013, p. 509). 
  
                                                 
14
 Grimm (1995, p. 291) refers to Oppermann when using this expression.  
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Conceptions of Citizenship in the Nation-based Model 
In the understanding of EU citizenship found in the nation-based model, one citizen is linked 
to one nation-state with one prevailing national identity (Schnapper, as cited in Olsen, 2013, 
p. 511). Advocates of the nation-based model contend that meaningful citizenship is 
contingent upon the nation-state, as the existence of a national demos is considered a 
precondition for democracy. As Linklater (1998a, p. 23) aptly describes it, traditional 
conceptions of citizenship like the ones found in the nation-based model are “anchored in the 
world of the bounded community; they contend that it loses its precise meaning when 
divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality”; to be a citizen “is to have 
concrete rights against, and duties to, a specific sovereign state” and “to belong to a bounded 
political community which enjoys the right of collective self-determination, and which can 
decide who can enter its ranks and who can be turned away”.  
Olsen (2008, p. 42; 2013, p. 511) argues that this type of beliefs have been present since the 
beginning of the European integration process and have contributed to the shaping of EU 
citizenship. One manifestation of this is the fact that access to EU citizenship is determined by 
use of the “nationality principle”, dictating that it can only be given to those already holding 
citizenship in a member state. The addition of a TEU provision
15
 stating that EU citizenship is 
additional to, and does not replace national citizenship, is further proof of the importance of 
the beliefs embodied by the nation-based model. While the belief that ultimate sovereignty 
should lie with the member states is apparently strong, the existence of supranational rights 
(such as the right to move and reside freely and the right to stand for local and EP election in 
any member state) means that the member states have lost considerable control over their 
domestic policies. 
Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration on the Basis of the Nation-based Model  
People who have a view of European integration that is in line with the nation-based model 
are likely to believe that welfare migration poses a challenge to national welfare. From the 
nation-based standpoint, the extension of welfare benefits, and to whom they are bestowed, 
should be determined nationally. As nationality provides the main source for their identity, 
this is only natural. 
                                                 
15
 In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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With reference to the two basic dimensions of citizenship, the nation-based model of the EU 
places much greater emphasis on national identity and physical belonging than on rights 
derived purely from the legal status of citizenship.  
The Multinational Federal Model 
Basic Principles: European Identity & Division of Power 
In this model, decision-making power and jurisdiction would be transferred from the national 
to the supranational level, and the EU would be reconstructed as a federal state composed of 
already existing nation-states. The system of decision-making would be top-down, but with 
clear boundaries between its composite levels – leaving no doubt as to where decisions are 
made. In the case of a conflict between federal and state law, federal law would take 
precedence. The democratic legitimacy of this model would stem from direct representation 
of citizens in all relevant spheres at EU level. A federal EU, as envisioned in this model, 
would be dependent upon the creation of a European identity (based on common European 
values) to provide the foundation for its institutions (Olsen, 2013, p. 510). Citizenship would 
be nested between levels, with clearly defined rights and duties at each level. Decisions 
pertaining to the granting of citizenship would be made centrally (Olsen, 2013, pp. 509–510). 
Conceptions of citizenship in the Multinational Federal Model 
In the multinational federal model, EU citizenship is conceptualized as layered and varied. 
Because of the many national identities coexisting in the EU, Nicolaidis (2004, p. 91) argues 
that the EU is more of a “demoi-cracy” than a democracy, existing of peoples rather than a 
people. While having different national identities, members also share a European identity 
based on common values and European norms – there is unity in diversity. Being nested in a 
multi-level polity, it is quite easy to compare EU citizenship with citizenship in a federal 
state. While the fact that membership decisions are not taken at the central (EU) level is an 
important difference distinguishing EU citizenship from citizenship in federal states, it is also 
an arrangement which fits well with another feature of federalism – namely the 
accommodation of different political communities (Olsen, 2013, p. 513). 
EU citizenship also displays certain features of federalism related to the separation of rights 
between composite levels of government. Among the civic rights of EU, there are some that 
are exclusively linked to the supranational, such as the rights to petition the EP and the EU 
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Ombudsman and to contact the EU institutions. Furthermore, the rights to stand in local and 
European elections represent supranational political rights that follow from the status of 
citizenship (Olsen, 2013. P. 513). While these supranational rights are central to EU 
citizenship, there are as yet no political structures corresponding to the systems found at 
national level. This lack of extension of EU electoral rights, Olsen argues, impedes EU 
citizenship since national parliaments remain important through the Council. Because EU 
citizenship does not entail full citizenship at the national level when residing in a Member 
State where one is not a national, EU citizenship is not “portable” in the federal sense. 
Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration in the Multinational Federal Model 
Having a layered identity, adherents to the multinational federal model are likely to see 
themselves as both a member of a national community and the European community. 
Granting access to welfare benefits to other EU citizens should therefore not be problematic, 
given that the decision is taken at the appropriate level of government. The same goes for 
setting the scope of welfare benefits. 
The multinational federal model gives emphasis to both dimensions of citizenship. While the 
European polity envisioned by this model holds a multitude of different national identities, it 
also relies upon a shared European identity (based on common values and norms) to function. 
Moreover, it presupposes a clear division of rights and duties at different levels of 
government.   
The Cosmopolitan Model 
Basic Principles: Personhood & Universal Rights 
In this model, the EU would be a “non-state entity based on cosmopolitan principles, 
universal human rights, and the rule of law; a regional subset of a cosmopolitan global order” 
(Olsen, 2013, p. 510). As such, it would separate conceptions of democratic governance and 
individual rights from the nation-state. In order to enforce compliance with cosmopolitan 
norms, the cosmopolitan model would have a decision-making system that would be loosely 
coupled and functionally differentiated on several levels (member state, European, and 
global). Democratic legitimacy in this model would be founded on an individual basis, and 
the integrity of citizens would be secured through the observation of universal rights and 
higher-ranking law. Because rights in this model are seen as innately individual and universal, 
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and not bound by membership in a nation-state, citizenship would be genuinely post-national 
(Olsen, 2013, p. 510).  
Conceptions of citizenship in the Cosmopolitan Model 
Citizenship beyond the nation-state, as envisioned in the cosmopolitan model, is based on 
personhood rather than peoplehood. In this model, it is irrelevant which national (or regional) 
community a person belongs to. What matters is that rights are innately individual and 
universal. This model, then, completely breaks with the traditional understanding of 
citizenship as something linked to state and nation.  
When it comes to cosmopolitan traits present in the EU, Olsen argues that the link between 
citizenship, nationality and access to rights and benefits has been weakened somewhat. There 
is a partial move towards the “personhood” criterion in terms of access to rights, and “the 
entitlement to rights…is no longer completely dependent on the status of citizenship” (Olsen, 
2013, p. 514). Delanty contends that the Europeanization of citizenship can be seen as a 
gradual process of convergence; while total uniformity is considered unlikely, he nonetheless 
argues that “All the indications point to the pluralism of legal regimes” (Delanty, 2007, p. 67).  
Delanty (2007, p. 67) also maintains that “The EU is one of the best examples of a polity that 
has given a concrete form universal human rights”, and that there is a blurring between 
national rights and human rights because migrants increasingly have been able to make claims 
on the basis of human rights. Furthermore, the exercise of free movement has to some extent 
resulting in the “person” taking precedence over the “worker” (see the Martínez Sala case 
discussed in Castro Oliveira, 2002, pp. 78–80). Freedom of movement is more and more often 
interpreted as a fundamental right (Somek, as cited in Olsen, 2013, p. 514). A development 
that also points in the direction of a cosmopolitan understanding of EU citizenship is the 
extension of certain social rights by virtue of residency (Constant, 2006, p. 76). This 
development has been the result of rulings by the ECJ and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), and show how EU policies are impacting national citizenship institutions (the 
theory of Europeanization scholars). 
However, as pointed out by Olsen (2013, p. 514), the abovementioned developments with 
regard to rights do not extend to political citizenship and democratic participation in the 
national sphere. Instead, they are rights that are linked to movement between member states. 
As Bellamy (2008, p. 598) point out, “the rights conferred by EU citizenship are almost all 
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contingent on residence in another member state”. Moreover, Bellamy underlines that EU 
citizens’ right to reside in other member states than their own is dependent upon the ability to 
support oneself economically, and consequently is not unconditional. Factors such as these 
are why EU citizenship cannot be regarded as cosmopolitan.  
Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration in the Cosmopolitan Model 
From a cosmopolitan standpoint, welfare migration is not a challenge. Since everyone is a 
citizen of the EU/EEA (and of the world), it follows that welfare benefits should be equally 
available to everyone. 
The cosmopolitan model of the EU stresses the legal status dimension of citizenship, with 
universal rights being the focal point. Identity is considered to be of little consequence, as 
everyone is seen to be a citizen of not only a country, but also of a region and the world.  
Table 1 summarizes the empirical expectations related to the two dimensions of citizenship, 
measured as identity and rights. 
Table 1: Expectations linked to welfare migration in the three models of the EU 
 Nation-based Model Multinational 
Federal Model 
Cosmopolitan 
Model 
 
Identity Nationality provides 
the main source of 
individuals’ identities 
Everyone has a 
national and a 
European identity 
Everyone is a citizen 
of the EU/EEA (and 
of the world) 
Rights Member states 
should determine the 
extension of, and 
access to, welfare 
benefits.   
The extension of, and 
access to, welfare 
should be determined 
at the appropriate 
level of government  
(be it national or 
supranational level)  
Welfare benefits 
should be equally 
available to everyone 
working in the given 
country, as rights are 
innately individual 
and universal 
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2.2 Methodological Approach 
In order to analyze how different perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves in 
public debates in Scandinavia, and what sort of view on European integration they represent, 
this study will make use of what is normally referred to as “qualitative content analysis”. 
Here, the term “idea analysis” will be used, as this is a more specific term for a particular type 
of qualitative content analysis. Idea analysis is “the qualitative analysis of the presence of 
ideas in text, where interpretation is an essential aspect of the analysis” (Bratberg, 2014, p. 
57). It is precisely because idea analysis is well suited for mapping ideas in text, and for 
filtering them according to the context in which they occur, that this method has been chosen. 
The models presented above provide the analytical framework through which perceptions of 
welfare migration will be captured, filtered, and interpreted. This will provide the necessary 
grounds for comparison. 
The first section below is concerned with idea analysis as a method. It begins by discussing 
ideas in general and welfare migration in particular. Then it goes on to debate why the study 
of ideas is a worthwhile endeavor and which types of research purposes idea analysis might 
have. The last section is concerned with the thesis’ research design, and discusses the choices 
that have been made in the construction of the analytical framework that will be used in this 
thesis. It also gives a brief account of the data analyzed. 
2.2.1 Method 
Idea analysis is “the qualitative analysis of the presence of ideas in text, where interpretation 
is an essential aspect of the analysis” (Bratberg, 2014, p. 57). Bergström & Boréus (2012, p. 
140) define an idea as a mental construction, which unlike volatile impressions or attitudes, is 
characterized by a degree of stability and continuity. Ideas can be of an individual or a 
collective nature, meaning that they can influence either one person/a smaller group of 
persons or larger ideological and political movements. Furthermore, they can be normative or 
descriptive. While normative ideas imply a valuation of some sort, descriptive ideas express 
assumptions about the world, and are often causal beliefs (Bratberg 2014, p. 58–59). The idea 
of welfare migration, as defined in this study, is descriptive and normative, as it assumes that 
migrants choose which country to move to on the basis of the generosity of that country’s 
welfare system. 
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Because assumptions cannot always be pursued empirically, they are open to political 
coloring (Bratberg 2014, p. 59). This holds true for welfare migration. Since there is much 
dispute among researchers whether or not welfare generosity is a determinant of migration, 
political players can easily give welfare migration a specific political hue. This is illustrated 
by Schram, Nitz and Krueger (1998, p. 226–227): 
Welfare migration has frequently operated as a powerful symbol often narrated in the 
policy arena in statistical form with the effect of undermining support for public 
assistance. Welfare migration stories tend to reinforce the symbolic power of depicting 
welfare recipients as illegitimate self-seeking people who are abusing the system. 
Bratberg (2014, p. 60) underlines that we daily encounter causal beliefs that are colored by 
fundamental political views. Because descriptive ideas often have a normative anchoring, the 
line between descriptive and normative ideas is not always as clear-cut as it first appears. In 
the case of welfare migration, this means that how a politician or policy maker view welfare 
migration will depend on their pre-established views on inter alia the EU and European 
integration, migration and the welfare state. 
Purposes of Idea Analysis 
Describing ideas as the drive wheel of politics, Bratberg (2014, p. 57) maintains that ideas are 
what we should study if we wish to understand political players and their actions. In the 
succinct words of Mehta (2011, pp. 45–46): 
If, as Louis Wirth (1936) once said, the “most important thing to know about a man is 
what he takes for granted”, then the most important things to know about a society 
and its politics are its prevailing assumptions. Understanding how these assumptions 
became dominant, what role they play in determining policy while ascendant, and why 
they are replaced by other sets of assumptions [sic] should be at the heart of political 
science and political sociology. 
According to Mehta, ideas matter because they influence people’s actions. 
Ideas, broadly defined, are central to questions about agenda setting, social 
movements, revolutions, diffusion, policy choice, the conceptual categories that 
underlie politics, path dependency and path-shaping change, institution building, 
institutional stability, institutional change, voter identity formation, interestgroup [sic] 
formation, and political coalition building.  
(Mehta, 2011, pp. 24–25) 
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Idea analysis can serve several different purposes: it can be used to explain or to map ideas in 
text. If the starting point of the study is explanatory, ideas can be analyzed as either causes or 
consequences. If the starting point of the study is descriptive, however, the goal of the 
analysis will be to map which ideas occur and are salient in particular texts (Bratberg 2014, p. 
60–64; Bergström & Boréus 2012, p. 146). Bratberg asserts that mapping is not about 
describing or reproducing content; it is about capturing and filtering ideas from continuous 
text. In order to do this, the researcher must have an ability to understand the context in which 
the text is produced — the analysis must be anchored in a prior knowledge of the text 
message or the sender of the text. Mapping also implies an element of comparison, where the 
ideas or perceptions identified can be compared to with those of earlier texts, with specific 
empirical expectations, or with those of other players. 
Mehta (2011, p. 25–27) considers ideas at three different levels of generality that are relevant 
if one wishes to understand the policy process. On these three levels, ideas function as policy 
solutions, problem definitions, or public philosophies or zeitgeist. When an idea serves as a 
policy solution, it provides the means for solving a given problem and accomplishing certain 
objectives. Since problems and objectives are not necessarily pre-established, however, ideas 
can play the role of problem definitions. Mehta (2011, p. 27) describes a problem definition as 
“a particular way of understanding a complex reality”, and highlights that “the way a problem 
is framed has significant implications for the types of policy solutions that will seem 
desirable, and hence much of political argument is fought at the level of problem definition”. 
Lastly, an idea can function as a public philosophy or as a zeitgeist. As such, the idea is 
broader, and contains a set of assumptions. The difference between a public philosophy and a 
zeitgeist is that while public philosophies are contestable, zeitgeists are not open to criticism 
(that is, in a particular historical moment). If a public philosophy is sufficiently dominant, 
however, it can become the zeitgeist for a time. Whether the analysis will have an explanatory 
or a descriptive end, Mehta holds, depends on the part of the policy process one is concerned 
with, and at what level a specific idea is found. 
2.2.2 Research Design 
In this study, the primary objective is to map existing perceptions of welfare migration — to 
analyze them as problem definitions. Since both the problem (i.e. the extent to which welfare 
attracts migrants) and the objectives (i.e. what should be done about it) are unclear, this seems 
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like a logical place to start. Furthermore, it appears to be a worthwhile pursuit since the bulk 
of welfare migration research has been larger quantitative studies that have not been 
concerned with identifying which perceptions of welfare migration occur and are salient in 
public debates. 
Learning how different perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves, and what they 
consist of, is of key importance if one at a later stage would wish to examine another part of 
the policy process. This could either be what a given perception of welfare migration leads to 
(functioning as a policy solution) or what larger set of assumptions a given perception of 
welfare migration is a part of (functioning as a public philosophy). Public philosophies are 
linked to what was mentioned earlier, namely that ideas are susceptible to political coloring.  
Bratberg (2014, pp. 66–72) identifies two concrete ways of going about idea analysis: by use 
of ideal types, and by use of dimensions. These two techniques differ as to the level of 
specification of the analytical framework. When using ideal types, the purpose is to define a 
set of key characteristics that are specific for a class or category – to construct a pure type, an 
ideal, by which phenomena from the real world can be measured against. In the words of 
Weber (1968, p. 20): “The more sharply and precisely the ideal type has been constructed, 
thus the more abstract and unrealistic…it is, the better it is able to perform its functions in 
formulating terminology, classifications, and hypotheses”. When using dimensions, on the 
other hand, the starting point is less developed; phenomena are measured along one or several 
ideological axes, where two different ideas represent the extremes. While dimensions are 
often used in studies concerned with analyzing change over time, ideal types are useful when 
attempting to map an array of ideas, and when attempting to determine which ideas are the 
predominant. Since mapping perceptions of welfare migration is the main objective of this 
thesis, this study will make use of ideal typical models. 
The manner in which a given study is structured has implications for the validity and the 
verifiability of the analysis. This study is deductively oriented since, as asserted by Bratberg 
(2014, p. 73), it is only natural that the analytical framework by which the ideas will be 
captured and filtered is developed before the actual analysis is conducted. A thoroughly 
developed framework, constructed on the basis of material other than that being analyzed, 
contributes to the testability of the analysis and increases the reliability of potential findings. 
Here, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the analytical framework consisting of 
three models of the EU is based on EU citizenship theory. In an attempt to make the analysis 
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as verifiable as possible, the analysis also gives a description of how relevant information has 
been sought out in the various documents.  
The three models of the EU provide the framework through which the different ideas, or 
perceptions, of welfare migration will be captured, filtered, and interpreted. By use of the two 
main dimensions of citizenship (see section 2.1.1), the models will capture relevant 
information from all parties, which accordingly will be placed where they belong. This 
provides the necessary grounds for comparison, both within each country and across the three 
countries.  
2.2.3 Data 
As a first step in uncovering which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate in 
political debates in Scandinavia, this thesis will analyze the party platforms of all the political 
parties currently represented in parliament. Bratberg (2014, pp. 74–75) states that if one is 
interested in a party’s ideological profile, it is natural to study their public communication, 
such as election manifestos and more long-term statements of principles. Moreover, Bratberg 
maintains that as publicly known, often standardized documents, they are also well suited for 
comparison. Given the aim of this thesis, it seems pertinent to examine this type of 
documents.  
Some advantages to party platforms are precisely that they are meant to express ideological 
essence and that they are well suited for comparison. A disadvantage is that while such 
documents express a party’s official values, principles and standpoints on various issues, one 
does not know if the party lives up to these values and principles in practice (Ryghaug, 2002, 
p. 306). Which kind of policies a party actually pursues might be better accounted for by 
parliamentary debates or public statements.    
Because party platforms consist of both values and actions, they are not necessarily found in 
one single document. For this reason, several different types of documents are analyzed in this 
thesis, including statement of principles, action programs and election manifestos from the 
also parliamentary election in each country (2013 in Norway, 2014 in Sweden, and 2011 in 
Denmark). 
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Data Collection 
The types of documents found in the three countries vary somewhat. This could potentially be 
a methodological challenge, as this study wish to compare the findings from the three 
countries. Nearly all documents analyzed from Norway are election manifestos published in 
connection with the parliamentary election in 2013. These manifestos often consist of both 
principles and desired actions that the parties wish to take should they be elected into 
government. Some of the parties have separate statements of principles, which have also been 
analyzed (the oldest of which is from 2007).  
The documents found in Sweden are quite similar to the ones found in Norway. Nearly all 
parties have election manifestos published in connection with the parliamentary election in 
2014. Most of the parties also have separate statements of principles (the oldest of which is 
from 2001) that have been analyzed. For one of the Swedish parties, adequate information 
could not be found in their election manifesto or other relevant documents. For this reason, 
some information from their website concerning their policies has been used in the analysis.  
The documents found from Denmark vary more than in the other two countries. This is in part 
due to the fact that the Danish parties do not publish comprehensive election manifestos in 
connection with parliamentary elections, as elections are determined by the incumbent prime 
minister and announced only weeks before the actual election takes place. While many of the 
parties have more long-term statements of principles or party programs (the oldest of which is 
from 1997), it has for several parties been necessary to find additional information from their 
websites.    
While there is some variation in the types of documents found in the three countries, all the 
documents analyzed are documents that express the parties’ values and positions in recent 
time. The documents that have the greatest variation in terms of creation date are the 
statements of principles. Since these documents express fundamental values and principles, 
however, it is assumed that they remain relatively stable over time. The information found on 
desired policies and actions is generally more recent.  
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has presented and discussed the theoretical and methodological approach to next 
chapter’s empirical analysis. In order to place perceptions of welfare migration within the 
larger discussion on European integration, this study makes use of EU citizenship theory. This 
theory is the basis of the thesis’ analytical framework, which is made up of three different 
models of the EU. Idea analysis is the method that will be used, as it is particularly well suited 
for the aim of this thesis – namely to map existing perceptions of welfare migration and to 
interpret these according to the context they occur in. 
A number of empirical expectations regarding how welfare migration is understood at 
national level can be inferred from the three theoretical models presented in this chapter. The 
central question is whether or not welfare migration will be seen as a challenge to national 
welfare systems. While people subscribing to a cosmopolitan view of European migration are 
likely not to see welfare migration as a challenge, people with a nation-based outlook are 
indeed expected to express concerns about welfare-induced migration. Which view adherents 
to the multinational federal model will take, is unclear. The next chapter will show whether 
these empirical expectations are correct or not. 
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3 Analysis 
This chapter investigates which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among 
political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In order to get a broad overview of which 
perceptions of welfare migration exist, this chapter examines the party platforms of all parties 
currently in parliament in each country. Because welfare migration is a contested 
phenomenon, and consequently liable to political coloring, it is interesting to look at parties’ 
official positions on the subject. More importantly, since these are the parties represented in 
parliament, their perceptions of welfare migration have the potential to influence policies.  
By using the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter, the analysis determines 
how perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves and which model or models of the 
EU best account for the different parties’ views on the two main dimensions of citizenship 
(see section 2.1.1). Two aspects of these main dimensions, namely identity and rights, are 
seen to be particularly relevant when examining perceptions of welfare migration. This is 
because the manner in which a party regards identity – determining who belongs to a given 
society and who does not – clearly affects their view on who should be given access to rights 
such as welfare benefits.  
Identity and belonging is investigated by looking at what notions bind a community of 
citizens together, how membership is framed in terms of belonging, and which characteristics 
are used to separate an us from a them. Accordingly, it will be particularly relevant to 
examine the parties’ fundamental values, the society they envision and work for, and how 
they discuss immigration and integration. Rights are investigated by looking at their 
extension, on whom they are bestowed, and the degree to which they are exclusive. Since the 
context of this thesis is the EU/EEA, and perceptions of welfare migration are closely linked 
to freedom of movement, it will be natural to examine the parties’ positions on the EU, labor 
immigration and the rights they believe labor migrants should or should not be given access 
to. The legal status aspects of formal membership criteria (used to determine inclusion in the 
polity) and participation (participatory rights and duties seen to be connected with access to 
welfare benefits) will also be briefly discussed.  
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3.1 Norway 
There are currently eight political parties represented in the Norwegian parliament. A factor 
that might influence the parties’ view on the different dimensions of citizenship is their 
position on Norwegian EU membership. In this matter, there are three wings among the 
parties currently represented in parliament: Those that are in favor of Norway joining the EU 
(the Labour Party and the Conservative Party), those that are against EU membership (the 
Socialist Left Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party), and those that take 
no official position and leave it up to the Norwegian public to decide in a future referendum 
(the Progress Party, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party).  
3.1.1 The Socialist Left Party 
The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), the most leftist party represented in the 
Norwegian parliament, clearly sees identity as layered and nested. In their declaration of 
principles, they state that in today’s global world it is becoming increasingly more common to 
have multiple affiliations and to have a sense of belonging to several places. They underline 
that this does not necessarily have to mean that people are less loyal citizens of Norway, and 
argue that the Norwegian community should have room for many ways of being Norwegian 
(SV, 2011, p. 10). This view clearly fit into the cosmopolitan model, in which all citizens are 
seen to have multi-level, nested identities. Because multiple affiliations should be met with 
understanding, the party wishes to allow dual citizenship. Dual citizenship, they argue, is an 
important step toward a more open and inclusive society that is accepting of a population with 
affiliations to several countries and cultures (SV, 2013, p. 98). Furthermore, the Socialist Left 
Party explicitly state that they are against the introduction of Norwegian language proficiency 
and societal/cultural knowledge tests as necessary requirements for becoming naturalized 
citizens, as suggested by several of the other political parties in the Norwegian parliament. In 
the party’s view, then, Norwegian language should not be one of the criteria by which formal 
membership should be determined. 
In terms of rights, the party’s election manifesto for the current parliamentary term (2013‒
2017) shows that they believe that everyone working in Norway should be treated equally in 
terms of wages and working conditions. They argue that a well-organized work life and 
robust labor legislation can hinder social dumping (SV, 2013, p. 27). This is particularly 
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relevant for migrant workers. They contend that everyone working in Norway must be 
protected against exploitation, poor wages and poor working conditions; policies that combat 
social dumping must be actively pursued in order to prevent the development of a subclass of 
workers from immigrant backgrounds (SV, 2013, p. 132). 
Like their view on identity, their belief that everyone working in Norway should be entitled to 
the same rights and benefits – that rights be universal – suggests a cosmopolitan point of 
view. At the same time, while European labor migration is viewed in a positive light because 
it supplies Norway with skilled workers and new opportunities, they contend that the 
flexibility of the workforce in the EEA is often misused to force poorer wages and more 
unsafe working conditions. In order to ensure that Norwegian wages and working conditions 
are not undermined, the party wishes to have more control with labor immigration (SV, 2013, 
p. 127). Moreover, they emphasize that decisions pertaining to Norwegian working conditions 
should be handled domestically and not at the EU level. They state that it is urgent to ensure 
that the EEA cannot overrule collective wage agreements, that legislation pertaining to work 
and working conditions cannot be weakened by the EU, and that EU rules cannot set aside 
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions that Norway has committed itself to 
(SV, 2013, p. 27). 
Given these beliefs, it is not surprising that the party is critical of the EEA Agreement and 
wishes to replace it with a less comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement. They argue 
that the EEA Agreement promotes labor policies that make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
maintain the Norwegian model in the long run (SV, 2013, p. 10). As long as the EEA 
Agreement continues, they underline, Norwegian authorities must utilize the reservation 
clause
16
 more actively. Of particular importance is preventing that ECJ rulings on the 
deregulation of the labor market are allowed to take effect in Norway (SV, 2013, p. 125). 
Instead of membership in a supranational union that has the capability to transfer power over 
important societal issues away from nationally elected bodies, the party desires Norwegian 
participation in an intergovernmental European cooperation scheme (SV, 2013, p. 125). 
                                                 
16
 The reservation clause is a mechanism of the EEA Agreement enabling the EEA countries (Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein) to opt out of legislation coming from the EU. A reservation means that the 
EEA Joint Committee (Norway / Iceland / Liechtenstein and EU) have not reached agreement on a 
specific regulation or set of regulations from the EU. If the countries have not reached agreement 
within six months of the reservation, the “affected parts” of the EEA Agreement are suspended. See 
http://www.europeiskungdom.no/hva-er-reservasjonsretten/  
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3.1.2 The Labour Party 
With regard to identity, Norway’s Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) maintains that high levels of 
trust and a willingness for unity are important explanations for the development of the 
qualities that constitute the Norwegian welfare society – with small differences in living 
conditions, a universal welfare state, and a high level of participation both in the workforce 
and in civil society (Ap, 2013, p. 8). When it comes to immigration, the party argues that in a 
social democracy such as Norway, differences and diversity must be met with tolerance. 
Integration, they contend, “is a responsibility that the minority and majority populations must 
share. This responsibility is founded on a consensus on [sic] everyone having equal duties and 
rights” (Ap, 2013, p. 9). The party also wishes to introduce a Norwegian language test as a 
prerequisite for acquiring citizenship (Ap, 2013, pp. 89–90). 
The party emphasizes that as a society becomes more diverse, it must be explicit about what 
its foundation is. Norwegian society, they argue, is founded on a set of common values that 
have been developed over a long period of time, including democracy, the rule of law, respect 
for human rights, and equality. In the party’s description of Norwegian society, it is these 
values (in addition to high levels of trust and solidarity) that bind Norwegians together – and 
make up the Norwegian identity. The notions that according to the Labour Party bind 
Norwegians together, are not particular to Norway as a nation. Rather, they are notions that 
are particular to social democracy. While the party sees language as the key instrument to 
integration, it is not considered a vital part of the foundation of Norwegian society. The 
party’s view on identity, then, appears to be a cosmopolitan view that allows for multiple, 
nested identities. This is confirmed when looking at their hopes for a global welfare society: 
The Labour Party's fundamental values of freedom, solidarity and equal opportunities 
do not stop at national borders. We desire a global welfare society founded on active 
governments in which everyone has social security, employment and an opportunity to 
provide for oneself and one's family.  
(Ap, 2013, p. 10) 
In terms of rights, the Labour Party, like the Socialist Left Party, wishes to safeguard wages 
and working conditions for everyone working in Norway. However, while in general having a 
positive attitude toward worker mobility in the EEA, the Labour party also identifies 
challenges connected to the increased influx of migrant workers, particularly following the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements: 
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Increased labour immigration has given us important manpower, [sic] however, in 
some segments of working life it has also resulted in problems associated with social 
dumping. Large-scale movement of manpower across national borders, combined with 
outsourcing tasks, is placing increasing pressure on the Norwegian working life 
model.  
(Ap, 2013, p. 15) 
Unlike the Socialist Left Party, however, the Labour Party is much more positive towards the 
EEA Agreement. The Agreement, they contend, ensures equal treatment for both companies 
and individuals seeking employment or residence in European countries (Ap, 2013, p. 95). 
The EEA Agreement is positive for Norway and has contributed to strengthening the 
rights of many workers in Europe and Norway. The Labour Party will actively exploit 
the opportunities that lie within the agreement, to ensure that Norway will continue to 
have good regulation of working life.  
(Ap, 2013, p. 15) 
The party underlines that they wish to work for a common set of rules in the internal market 
that respects the principles and rights that are valid in the Norwegian labor market (Ap, 2013, 
p. 96): 
We will seek to ensure that the new EU rules do not create obstacles to measures that 
Norway has introduced or plans to introduce, such as the plans of action against 
social dumping. It is particularly important to safeguard wage earners and workers 
who participate in cross-border establishments and services and to protect their 
collective rights including the right to strike.  
(Ap, 2013, p. 15) 
In terms of welfare rights, the party expresses some concern for exploitation of the welfare 
system and argues that with the current changes in migration flows, a review of the current 
welfare legislation is necessary: 
Persons who earn National Insurance benefits in Norway may be eligible to take these 
benefits with them when they relocate to another country. With today's relocation 
flows, it is necessary to take a closer look at whether the regulations are in step with 
the new reality. In the development of our welfare society, we put more emphasis on 
services rather then [sic] cash transfers. We would like to link obligations to benefits. 
(Ap, 2013, p. 53) 
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That the Labour Party is more positive to the EEA Agreement than the Socialist Left Party is 
perhaps not surprising, considering that they believe that membership of the EU would be 
beneficial for Norway (Ap, 2013, p. 95). They do not state that decisions pertaining to 
working conditions in Norway should be determined in Norway. Rather, they suggest a more 
active role for Norway in the EEA, through which Norway could influence the rules and 
regulations that are valid in the EEA to bring them up to Norwegian standards. This view on 
rights in the EEA suggests at minimum a multinational federal view on rights, but more likely 
a cosmopolitan one. This view is confirmed when investigating the party’s views on global 
relations and governance, as discussed in the election manifesto. The party maintains that 
working for international recognition of ILO’s core conventions is still one of their main 
issues. Furthermore, they argue that free trade agreements must safeguard workers’ rights and 
that they will make efforts to ensure that a requirement for good working standards and 
decent working conditions be included in a new World Trade Organization (WTO) round 
(Ap, 2013, pp. 93‒94). 
3.1.3 The Centre Party 
From the point of view of the Centre Party (Senterpartiet), trust, a sense of community and 
equality are described as the cornerstones of Norwegian society. The good society, they 
contend, depends upon broad popular participation in politics and society. A sense of 
community, they argue, presupposes that there are certain shared values, symbols and 
institutions that people have a communal affiliation to. A unifying national church, the 
monarchy, the public school system, and the Norwegian language are some of the institutions 
that the party identifies as sustainers of Norwegian identity (Sp, 2013, p. 24). Identity, then, is 
both unitary and national and a perfect fit for the nation-based model. Given the party’s view 
on identity, it is not surprising that they wish to introduce tests in Norwegian language and 
Norwegian society and culture as requirements for obtaining citizenship (Sp, 2013, p. 32). 
Because broad popular participation is seen as vital for the existence of the good community, 
the party opposes centralization, which they believe creates alienation and a loss of 
accountability. Unsurprisingly, then, the party argues that Norway must preserve its national 
independence and self-government and announce themselves as a party for those who support 
international cooperation between sovereign democratic nation-states (Sp, 2013, pp. 5, 24). 
What is more, they contend that a strong democracy presupposes a well-functioning nation-
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state. Consequently, they are against the transfer of authority to supranational bodies such as 
the EU. They believe that the EU is gradually progressing towards a federal polity and this, 
they argue, offers representative government bad conditions. They also wish to terminate the 
EEA Agreement and replace it with multiple bilateral trade- and cooperation agreements. As 
long as the EEA Agreement is in effect, they argue, Norway must have a restrictive attitude 
toward the relinquishment of power to the EU through the agreement, and the reservation 
clause must be used actively (Sp, 2013, pp. 6, 34, 46–47). 
In terms of welfare and rights, the party argues that there is a contract between the individual 
– who takes responsibility and contributes to society, and the state – that provides security and 
freedom, and that this contract is the glue of the welfare society (Sp, 2013, p. 25). In their 
view then, the welfare of the individual is linked to their contribution to the state. Because the 
EEA is perceived as a threat to the Norwegian welfare model, the part contends that Norway 
must opt out of EEA directives and regulations that threaten the Norwegian model (Sp, 2013, 
p. 48). While stating that labor immigration to Norway has contributed positively to the 
Norwegian economy and the development of welfare, the party underlines that it also poses 
challenges in terms of how the welfare state should be organized. They argue that the export 
of welfare benefits to EEA citizens who do not live in Norway, in particular, poses a 
challenge to the Norwegian welfare system – as large populations acquire welfare rights after 
only a short stay in Norway. This, they contend, challenges the sustainability of the 
Norwegian welfare system in the long term. For this reason, the party questions current 
welfare arrangements and argues in favor of more restrictive arrangements – and of 
challenging the EEA Agreement in this policy area. They also point to labor immigration as a 
challenge to wage formation in Norway, in particular in occupations where it is not necessary 
to master Norwegian. The solution they offer is better regulation on the part of Norwegian 
authorities (Sp, 2013, pp. 49–50). 
The party’s belief that Norway should opt out of EEA regulations threatening the Norwegian 
model, and indeed that Norway should be run by nationally elected officials, clearly points in 
the direction of a nation-based view of rights – namely that each country should determine the 
extension of, as well as who are given access to, welfare benefits. 
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3.1.4 The Christian Democratic Party 
The policies of Norway’s Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) are founded on 
what they describe as the Christian democratic ideology, which emphasizes three fundamental 
values: the Christian view of humanity, love for your neighbor, and the responsibility of 
stewardship. While Christian values constitute the basis of the party’s ideology, they clearly 
state that they support freedom of religion and wish to work for an optimal society for 
everyone (KrF, 2013, p. 11).  
In terms of integration, the party (KrF, 2013, p. 105) holds that “The diversity that immigrants 
bring with them is an enrichment for Norway”. The overall goal of integration policies should 
be that migrants coming to Norway feel respected and that they belong to the community, 
with the same rights and duties that all inhabitants of Norway have. At the same time, the 
party underlines that everyone who wants to live in Norway must support some fundamental 
values, including respect for human rights, democracy, solidarity, equality and tolerance. 
Because they believe Norwegian language to be the key to integration, the party wishes to 
introduce a Norwegian language proficiency test as a prerequisite for attaining citizenship. 
They also wish to introduce a test on Norwegian society and culture (KrF, 2013, pp. 105–
106). 
The Christian Democratic Party argues that the Norwegian community is bound together 
through the shared support for the fundamental values mentioned above, values believed to 
originate in the Christian democratic ideology. When accepted into the community, people 
belong by virtue of their equal rights and duties. The party does not make reference to any 
values or notions that are specifically Norwegian. Instead, their basic values are universal 
ones. The party’s value-oriented ideology, then, is in keeping with the view on identity as 
found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU, in which people have multiple identities. 
Discussing the Norwegian workforce, the party states that “Ensuring enough manpower will 
be a challenge in the near future”. Continued labor immigration, they argue, will be integral to 
remedying this situation. In terms of rights, they wish to ensure that labor migrants have the 
same working conditions as Norwegian employees (KrF, 2013, p. 76). The party believes that 
most immigrants who come to Norway do so because of work or family reunion (KrF, 2013, 
p. 94). While having a generally positive outlook on labor immigration and migration in 
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general, they concede that the increased number of foreigners working in Norway has created 
challenges: 
The work immigration [sic] has also created increasing challenges for the work 
towards preventing social dumping. KrF wants everyone who works in Norway to 
have good salary and working conditions, regardless of nationality or what country 
their employer is registered in.  
(KrF, 2013, p. 85) 
In terms of Norway’s affiliation with the EU, the party argues in favor of a continued 
association through the EEA Agreement, despite the democratic challenges following from 
Norway’s inability to participate in decision-making processes (KrF, 2013, p. 126). They do 
not wish Norway to become a full member of the EU, as this “might weaken our freedom of 
action in several important areas” (KrF, 2013, p. 125). While not wishing Norway to become 
a full-fledged EU member, the Christian Democratic Party’s position on rights is clearly in 
agreement with the view on rights found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU. Though the 
party does not explicitly mention any sort of global order, the centrality of human worth and 
solidarity in their ideology is a good fit with the cosmopolitan belief that rights are universal. 
3.1.5 The Liberal Party 
The Liberal Party (Venstre) describe themselves as Norway’s social-liberal party. Liberal 
policies, they argue, combines personal freedom with responsibilities toward each other and 
society (Venstre, 2013, p. 4). The party’s policies are based on an ideology that they 
summarize in ten principles: First, freedom for everyone, everywhere. Second, personal 
responsibility is absolute. Third, everyone has a shared responsibility for one another, for the 
environment and for future generations. Fourth, real freedom presupposes a sense of 
community and justice. Fifth, everyone is equal, but no one is the same. Sixth, politics shall 
further quality of life and human growth. Seventh, political power shall originate at the 
grassroots. Eight, that power be distributed and balanced. Ninth, the liberal state is impartial, 
strong and limited. Tenth, liberalism is optimistic and always changing (Venstre, 2007, pp. 6–
9). 
In terms of immigration, the party contends that the opportunity to move freely is a 
fundamental right, and believes that the right to seek happiness for oneself and one’s family 
should not be limited by place of birth (Venstre, 2007, p. 27). Having a positive outlook on 
49 
 
migration, the party argues that cultural and economic stimulus through immigration makes 
society stronger, richer and more diverse. At the same time, they highlight that migration also 
challenges society – not least when it comes to the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare 
state. The party believes that everyone who comes to Norway should be given the chance to – 
and has a duty to – learn Norwegian and to acquaint themselves with Norwegian norms and 
society. The party wishes to introduce a requirement that applicants must be able to master a 
minimum of spoken Norwegian to acquire Norwegian citizenship. They also wish to allow 
dual citizenship (Venstre, 2013, pp. 88–90). 
The party’s ideology, their positive outlook on immigration and their wish to allow dual 
citizenship suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple, nested identities – a view that 
fits into the cosmopolitan model of the EU. This impression is supported by their positive 
opinion of the EU as an arena for economic and political cooperation and for peace and 
democracy building across Europe. While having pushed for the EEA Agreement, the party 
believes that the current situation, in which Norway is economically and legally integrated, 
but left standing outside of political decision-making processes, leaves something to be 
wanted. For this reason, the party argues for the democratization of the relationship with the 
EU through a more effective treatment of political issues in the Norwegian parliament. As for 
whether or not Norway should join the EU, the party believes that it is something that should 
be decided by popular vote (Venstre, 2007, p. 14; Venstre, 2013, p. 98). 
Because the party believes Norwegian businesses to be dependent upon attracting foreign 
manpower, and that access to manpower is vital for economic growth, they wish to pursue 
labor migration policies that will make it easier for foreigners to come to Norway for work – 
both from within and from outside of the EEA. In terms of rights, the party maintains that 
everyone working in Norway should be entitled to decent wages, regardless of whether they 
are employed on a permanent, temporary or seasonal basis. The party also argues that the 
authorities and the unions must have effective systems to combat unacceptable wages and 
working conditions. The party wishes to introduce a national minimum wage as an instrument 
against social dumping (Venstre, 2013, pp. 58–59, 89). This suggests that the Liberal Party 
subscribes to a cosmopolitan view on rights and welfare – namely that welfare should be 
equally available to everyone. 
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3.1.6 The Conservative Party 
According to the Conservative Party (Høyre), the Nordic countries are characterized by their 
open market economies, cooperation, equality and a high level of trust between citizens. 
Furthermore, the party contends that small societal differences constitute a Nordic value that 
is linked to Nordic culture and traditions. To maintain the values inherent in the Nordic 
model, education and welfare policies must “enable as many as possible to participate actively 
in social and working life” (Høyre, 2013, p. 5). The ideal behind the party’s policies is what 
they describe as “a society with opportunities for all” (2013, p. 89). The party believes such a 
society to be built on a number of principles, including confidence in the individual (who 
should be given the greatest possible freedom to determine how to live their life), diversity, 
freedom of choice, unity and solidarity, inclusion, subsidiarity, and rule of law (Høyre, 2008, 
p. 3). 
The principle of diversity mentioned above is related to immigration, and seen as a source of 
new impulses and cultural exchange – contributing to new thinking, innovation and creativity. 
However, “While immigration has helped economic growth…there are challenges associated 
with immigration and integration” (Høyre, 2013, p. 94). Ensuring participation in the 
workforce and a good knowledge of Norwegian language, the party maintains, are the keys to 
inclusion in Norwegian society. For this reason, they wish to include language and knowledge 
tests as a part of the application process for Norwegian citizenship (Høyre, 2013, p. 94). 
While the principles constituting the Conservative Party’s ideology are not particular to 
Norway, their emphasis on the Nordic model in describing Norwegian society does seem to 
place high value on a specific identity based on Nordic culture and traditions. Since a Nordic 
identity is not a national identity, it seems like the party does not accepts the purely unitary 
view on identity found in the nation-based model of the EU. However, given the emphasis 
placed on Nordic values linked to culture and tradition, it does not either appear like the party 
supports the cosmopolitan view on identity. Given the party’s wish to join the EU (discussed 
below), it does seem probable that the party is willing to accept the view on identity found in 
the multinational federal model of the EU – that within the European region, individuals can 
have multi-level identities. 
Discussing labor migration, the Conservative Party contends that Norway is dependent on 
labor immigration to ensure continued economic growth (Høyre, 2013, p. 89). While having a 
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generally positive outlook on the economic contribution of labor migrants, the party 
underlines that new migration patterns also challenges current welfare schemes: 
New patters of migration are bringing pressure to bear on today’s welfare schemes. 
The Conservative Party wants to ensure a satisfactory and sustainable welfare society 
also in the future, and intends to achieve this by adapting welfare schemes to the new, 
global reality.  
(Høyre, 2013, p. 87) 
Because of these changes, they state that they will “Evaluate how welfare schemes can be 
adapted to new patterns of European and global migration” and “Consider measures that can 
limit the export of social assistance, but within the framework of the international agreements 
that Norway is bound by” (Høyre, 2013, p. 88). In other words, while accepting the EEA 
Agreement, they believe that as a result of increased European migration, current welfare 
schemes are liable to abuse. At the same time, the party argues that “Access to the EU’s 
internal market through the EEA Agreement is a key precondition for maintaining the level of 
welfare in Norwegian society” (Høyre, 2013, p. 100). Moreover, they state that in the long 
term, they wish to replace the EEA Agreement with full membership in the EU. 
While not making any explicit reference to labor migrants’ rights, they imply – through their 
stated respect for the international agreements Norway is bound by (of which the EEA 
agreement is number one) and their wish for Norway to become a full-fledged member of the 
EU – that EEA citizens working in Norway should have rights. Whether these should be on 
par with those of Norwegian workers’ is unclear. It does however seem highly probable that 
the party has a view on rights that fits well with the multinational federal model of the EU, in 
which EEA citizens’ access to welfare should be determined at the appropriate level of 
government. 
3.1.7 The Progress Party 
Norway’s Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) describe themselves as a “liberal people’s 
party”. With liberalism as their ideological starting point, the party places high value on 
individual freedom, and believe that most people are capable of making their own decisions 
and dealing with the consequences of those decisions. The party’s guiding principles, they 
contend, are built on the Norwegian constitution and Norwegian and Western tradition and 
52 
 
cultural heritage, which are based on a Christian worldview and humanistic values (Frp, 
2013a, p. 2). 
In terms of integration, the Progress Party believes that placing demands on immigrants is to 
show them respect. They argue in favor of conditioning a greater number of social benefits on 
immigrants’ willingness to integrate and to learn Norwegian. They contend that by making 
the completion of courses in Norwegian language and society as well as job training 
prerequisites for obtaining social benefits, Norwegian will be established as a shared language 
for everyone. Furthermore, they argue that social benefits to a greater degree should be 
attached to citizenship or “other appropriate delimitations”. In order to acquire citizenship, the 
party wishes applicants to demonstrate knowledge about Norwegian society, adequate 
Norwegian language skills and the ability to provide for themselves and their family (Frp, 
2013b, pp. 38–39). The party’s vision of Norwegian society, with its emphasis on 
immigrants’ willingness to integrate, suggests a view on identity in which nationality is 
central. As such, their point of view matches that of the nation-based model of the EU, in 
which identity is something unitary. 
Discussing labor migration, the party maintains that Norway should be able to meet the need 
for labor within its own population. By making arrangements that stimulate people’s 
willingness to work (for example by lowering the tax burden and getting more social security 
recipients into the workforce), they argue, this can be ensured. Any remaining need, they 
contend, can largely be covered by labor from the EEA. While it should also be possible to 
get labor from outside of the EEA, this type of labor should primarily be limited to work 
contracts of shorter duration (Frp, 2013b, p. 38). 
While not taking a stance on EU membership, the party is generally positive toward further 
integration in Europe and supports finding supranational solutions to questions pertaining to a 
number of areas, including policy areas related to free trade, common competition rules and 
individual freedoms. The party underlines the importance of the EEA Agreement as a 
guarantor of Norwegian access to the internal market, and is in principle a strong supporter of 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. At the same time, the party stresses 
that the right to move freely presupposes that people who settle in Norway not automatically 
obtain welfare benefits, as this puts a strain on Norwegian taxpayers (Frp, 2013a, p. 8; Frp, 
2013b, p. 34). 
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The 2004 enlargement of the EU in combination with the free flow of labor within the EEA, 
the party argues, has put pressure on Norwegian welfare schemes. Moreover, the rapid 
acquirement of welfare benefits and increased labor immigration from the EEA has led to an 
increase in the export of certain welfare benefits. Since Norwegian benefit payments are set 
according to Norwegian price levels and wages, this gives a comparatively high purchasing 
power in certain other countries. Because the Norwegian welfare system is vulnerable to high 
immigration, the party argues that is necessary to find new solutions to ensure the system’s 
continued sustainability and reduce the export of welfare benefits. In order to alter existing 
welfare schemes, the party believes that it is necessary to renegotiate the provisions of the 
EEA Agreement dealing with work and welfare schemes (Frp, 2013b, p. 58). 
The party’s dissatisfaction with the EEA rules regulating national payments of welfare 
benefits suggests a wish to reinstate stronger national control over this policy area. The belief 
that member states should be able to determine who are given access to, and the extension of, 
welfare benefits, indicates a view on rights that fits into the nation-based model of the EU. 
3.1.8 The Green Party 
In their declaration of principles, the Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne [MDG]) 
emphasizes solidarity – with people, future generations, and with animals and nature (MDG, 
2015, p. 4). They consider all individuals to be equal, and contend that they will work for 
representative democracy worldwide. In order to ensure democratic participation, the party 
believes that decision-making power should be located at the lowest level possible – while 
still being effective (MDG, 2015, p. 6). MDG regards cultural diversity as a precondition for 
fundamentally free and viable communities. Diversity, they believe, functions as a buffer 
against intolerance, extremism and totalitarian regimes, and is an indispensable source of 
inspiration and renewal. While giving emphasis to personal freedom, they underline that they 
believe that solidarity and compassion should set the limits for individual freedom – and not 
vice versa (MDG, 2015, p. 5). 
In the party’s declaration of principles, there is no mention of a national community that is 
separate from the international community. Rather, they underline that they put the interests 
of the global community higher than national interests (MDG, 2015, p. 7). This suggests a 
view on identity that allows for multiple affiliations – a view that fits well with into the 
identity dimension as found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU. While displaying a 
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cosmopolitan view on identity, the party also wishes to introduce Norwegian language and 
societal/cultural knowledge tests as requirements for obtaining permanent residence and 
citizenship in Norway (MDG, 2013, p. 52). This is suggested in connection with their 
discussion of equality, diversity and tolerance, and appears to be a measure suggested to 
counteract discrimination. 
In terms of rights, the Green Party believes in equal opportunities for all individuals. 
Furthermore, they believe the fair distribution of goods – between individuals, local 
communities, groups and countries – to be fundamental in ensuring that all people have the 
opportunity to live rich, safe and free lives. The party sees the principles behind the Nordic 
welfare model as a good starting point for this work (MDG, 2015, p. 7). The party makes no 
mention of EEA migrant workers’ rights in either their declaration of principles or in their 
election manifesto. Nor do they explicitly mention their stance on the EEA Agreement or 
membership of the EU. Given their disregard for national issues and belief in equal 
opportunities for people worldwide, however, it seems safe to assume that their belief in 
rights for all workers would match that of the cosmopolitan model. 
3.1.9 Summary 
A comparison of the Norwegian parties’ political platforms shows a number of differences 
between the parties with reference to the research question. There are variations both in terms 
of how parties place in the analytical framework (i.e. which model their view on identity and 
rights fit into) and with regard to how welfare migration is perceived. As table 3 (below) 
shows, the cosmopolitan model is the dominating model in Norway on both dimensions. 
Table 3 also shows an inner consistency in the parties’ views, with the placement on identity 
being the same on rights for all parties. This means that the parties’ view on which rights 
labor migrants from the EU/EEA are entitled to are on par with their more general view on 
identity. The Conservative Party is an interesting case as the only party to place within the 
multinational federal model. As an in-between category, it is more difficult to determine 
which parties belong here. The Conservative Party is placed in this category because they 
emphasize a Nordic identity, which is not strictly speaking national or cosmopolitan. On the 
rights dimension, their multinational federal placement is due to their emphasis on adapting 
current welfare schemes according to “new patterns of European and global migration” within 
the framework of the EEA Agreement.   
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Table 3 does however hide a number of differences between the parties placing within the 
same model. With regard to identity, these differences are mostly related to formal 
requirements for obtaining citizenship. There is no pattern in terms of which parties suggest 
which requirements, as the proposed requirements are found among the parties placing in all 
three models. The Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party would like to allow dual 
citizenship. The Labour Party and the Liberal Party would like to introduce a language 
requirement. And the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party and the Green Party 
would like to introduce both language and Norwegian society and culture tests. The Socialist 
Left Party, on the other hand, explicitly state that they are against the introduction of 
Norwegian language and society tests as preconditions for naturalization. While there is no 
clear pattern in terms of which parties suggest which requirements (as the proposed 
requirements are found among the parties placing in all three models models), these 
requirements arguably reflect the parties’ view on identity – as informal markers that are 
considered to be important for Norwegian citizens.  
Regarding the participation aspect of citizenship as a legal status, some assumptions can be 
made on the basis of whether welfare migration is defined as a problem or not. The parties 
that hold a cosmopolitan view and that are concerned about social dumping are likely to 
believe that labor migrants contribute to the economy and to society and that they therefore 
should be entitled to the same rights as everyone else. The parties that see welfare migration 
as a problem, on the other hand, probably believe that labor migrants do not participate to the 
same extent as national citizens, and that they therefore should not reap the benefits of the 
national welfare systems. This is a situation that they in all likelihood consider to be made 
worse when payments (such as child benefit) is sent out of the country, and therefore not 
going back into the respective national economies.  
With reference to the rights aspect of the legal status dimension, the study does not only show 
which view on rights the parties have in terms of the three models, but also whether welfare 
migration is defined as a problem. When comparing how the parties implicitly construe 
welfare migration in relation to labor migration within the EEA, two extremes present 
themselves: At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed seen to be a challenge –a 
threat to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of the scale, 
welfare migration is not perceived to be a problem at all. Instead, labor migration is seen to be 
problematic because it threatens workers’ rights and leads to social dumping. This scale of 
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concern for welfare migration at one extreme and concern for social dumping at the other 
extreme corresponds with the scale that the three models of the EU make up, with the nation-
based model on one end and the cosmopolitan model on the other.  
When investigating the party platforms in terms of whether or not welfare migration is 
perceived to be a problem, a clear pattern appears. The parties that fall within the nation-based 
and the multinational federal model of the EU – the Progress Party, the Centre Party and the 
Conservative Party – are the parties that most strongly express concern for welfare induced 
migration and the consequences this might have on national welfare systems. The parties that 
express concern about social dumping, on the other hand, all have views that fit into the 
cosmopolitan model. In fact, all Norwegian parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity and 
rights (with the exception of the Green Party, which does not discuss labor migration at all) 
also express concern about social dumping as a result of labor migration within the EEA. But 
also two of these parties – the Labour Party and the Liberal Party – express some concern 
about labor migration affecting the sustainability of the welfare state. In Norway, at least, 
there does appear to be a scale on which concerns about welfare migration as a result of labor 
immigration is found at one end and concerns about social dumping is found at the other. 
Table 2: Norwegian political parties’ placement on the identity and rights dimensions 
 Nation-based 
Model 
Multinational Federal 
Model 
Cosmopolitan Model 
Identity Centre Party (Sp) 
Progress Party (Frp) 
Conservative Party (H) Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Labour Party (Ap) 
Christian Democratic 
Party (KrF) 
Liberal Party (V) 
Green Party (MDG) 
Rights Centre Party (Sp) 
Progress Party (Frp) 
Conservative Party (H) Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Labour Party (Ap) 
Christian Democratic 
Party (KrF) 
Liberal Party (V) 
Green Party (MDG) 
 
Whether or not the parties wish Norway to join the EU does not appear to be a decisive factor 
in terms of placement, as there are EU-friendly parties found in support of the views 
advocated by all three models. Similarly, there are two parties – the Socialist Left and the 
Christian Democratic Party – that are against EU membership and yet have a cosmopolitan 
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view on identity and rights. The parties’ placement compared with their position on 
Norwegian EU membership might, however, be a reflection of the parties’ view on the 
manner in which European integration is pursued in the EU.   
3.2 Sweden 
There are currently eight political parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Regarding 
the Swedish parties’ position on Swedish membership of the EU, all parties except from the 
Left Party and the Sweden Democrats support membership and wish Sweden to remain a 
member. These two parties, however, would like Sweden to leave the Union.  
3.2.1 The Left Party 
Sweden’s Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) calls itself a “socialist and feminist party on ecological 
ground”. The party contends that everything the party does, it does in pursuit of one goal: to 
change society – by making men and women equal, by removing class differences and 
inequalities, and by creating ecologically sustainable solutions (V, 2015a). They believe that a 
country built on public welfare and solidarity is fundamentally stronger than a country in 
which market greed is allowed to run free. They argue that work, justice and democracy 
provide the foundation for a society in which everyone has a place (V, 2014). 
The party believes all humans to be of equal worth and contends that everyone has the right to 
live a life in peace and freedom. They state that they refuse to adapt to racism and 
xenophobia, and accordingly support a generous and humane refugee policy (V, 2015a). In 
terms of integration, the party believes in a society that is inclusive and which offers 
everyone, regardless of background, skin color, gender or sexuality, the right to education, 
employment and housing – a society in which everyone fights together against discrimination. 
In order to capitalize on the experiences and the resources that immigrants bring with them, 
the party argues that vigorous universal welfare policies and individual solutions are needed 
(V, 2015b). 
When discussing the values that bind society together, the party’s main focus is on equality. 
They believe universal welfare and solidarity to be important tools in creating a society in 
which everyone has a place and everyone is accepted. They wish to pursue policies that will 
make it easier for immigrants to integrate into Swedish society, but do not mention a 
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specifically Swedish culture that immigrants would need to adapt to. Rather, their position 
that Sweden should be a society that welcomes everyone and that should be willing to make 
allowances for immigrants’ individual needs, suggests a view on identity that would allow for 
multiple identities. The Left Party, then, appears to be an advocate of the view on identity 
found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU. 
On the topic of European cooperation, the party declares itself as a party that is principally 
against the EU. They believe that the EU restricts democracy, and criticizes the EU for 
prioritizing the interests of the internal market over the environment, labor law, public health, 
and consumer interests. The party is opposed to what they describe as the EU’s objective to 
build a new superstate, with a common foreign and security policy. They discourage any 
development in a federalist direction and work with the goal of bringing power back to the 
member states (V, 2015c). 
With regard to labor migration, the party contends that it is something that is generally 
beneficial to Sweden. At the same time, they underline that a number of problems accompany 
labor migration as the migrants are often exploited and mistreated. The party contends that 
many labor migrants work for wages and under conditions that are significantly worse that 
those which are applicable in the Swedish labor market. Not least, this applies to a large group 
of posted workers from other EU/EEA countries. The party emphasizes that everyone 
working in Sweden is entitled to wages and working conditions regulated by Swedish laws 
and collective agreements, regardless of where they are born and where they reside. Work and 
competition, they maintain, must be on equal terms (V, 2015d). 
In order to stop the exploitation of foreign labor and the dumping of wages and working 
conditions, the party argues that legally binding agreements on pay and working conditions 
must be in place. Furthermore, they highlight that workers who come forward about poor 
working conditions will not risk expulsion. These workers have the right to have their case 
tried in court and to obtain damages, and will be allowed to stay in Sweden to look for work 
for the duration of the original contract that has been breached (V, 2014). 
From their discussion on labor migration, it is clear that the Left Party has a view on rights 
fits that of the cosmopolitan model. The fact that they believe all people working in Sweden 
(regardless of place of birth or residence) to have the equal rights in the Swedish labor 
market, clearly demonstrates that they believe rights to be innately universal and individual. 
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3.2.2 The Swedish Social Democratic Party 
The Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) expresses a 
wish to create a society based on the ideals of democracy and on the principle that everyone 
has equal worth and equal rights. All people should be free to grow as individuals, to shape 
their own lives according to their own desires and to influence the community they live in. 
For this reason, the party sees equality as a precondition for freedom. As for solidarity, they 
claim that it is something that grows out of the realization that we are all interconnected 
(SAP, 2013, p. 4). Moreover, the party maintains that social democracy knows no national 
boundaries. For this reason, a global community based on the ideals of democracy is viewed 
as the ultimate goal (SAP, 2013, p. 5). The party’s notions of community are not particular to 
Sweden, but to social democracy. In terms of identity then, everyone is viewed as belonging 
to the same world – a view fitting well with the cosmopolitan model of the EU, in which 
everyone is thought to have multiple identities. 
In the matter of the EU, the party contends that it is necessary to change the Union in order to 
realize the potential it carries for European cooperation – both in terms of the direction of the 
EU’s common policies and in terms of the way the EU is organized. With reference to 
common policies, the party wishes the EU to become a union for social justice, full 
employment and sustainable development. While affirming the four freedoms of the internal 
market, the party underlines that companies’ freedom in the internal market must not come at 
the expense of the equal treatment of workers or at the expense of economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. The internal market must therefore be provided with a clear 
regulatory framework. Besides, the free movement of people in the internal market must be 
balanced out by workers’ right to organize across borders and a set of common minimum 
rules in the EU that ensures the protection of workers’ rights. In addition, the party wishes to 
develop a common European policy for full employment that is based on respect for workers’ 
rights and that will help prevent social dumping (SAP, 2013, p. 27). 
With respect to the organization of the EU, the party – while being a proponent of the 
subsidiarity principle – supports the continued development of EU policies in areas where the 
EU is best suited to provide solutions for challenges that are common to all of its member 
states. The party also argues that member states should be allowed to lead the way for better 
policies, for instance in areas such as the environment and labor law. The party maintains that 
the EU should to be an arena for intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states, and 
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rejects the idea of developing the EU into a federation (SAP, 2013, p. 28). The party also 
expresses a wish to work with the other Nordic countries to develop and strengthen the 
Nordic welfare model (2013, p. 28). 
Considering that the party wishes the member states, through the EU, to develop common 
policies for social justice (including creating a regulatory framework for the internal market), 
suggests at minimum a multinational federal outlook on rights, perhaps even a cosmopolitan 
one. After all, these are policies that protect workers in the EU/EEA as a whole. Concerning 
welfare, the party does not explicitly state that they wish migrant workers and other EU 
citizens to have the same access to benefits that Swedish citizens have. Given how they 
discuss welfare and rights in general however, it seems fair to assume that their view on rights 
is indeed cosmopolitan. While the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s view on rights appears 
to be cosmopolitan, they clearly state that they do not support a supranational EU functioning 
independently of the member states. 
3.2.3 The Green Party 
Sweden’s Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna) emphasizes unlimited solidarity – with animals 
and nature, with future generations, and with people all around the world. The party views 
society in a holistic manner, and considers everything to be interconnected and 
interdependent. Because society is for all and created by everyone, it must be built upon 
human rights and freedoms – where everyone has the same rights and is given the opportunity 
to contribute to society. In terms of diversity, the party believes that new ideas flourish in 
places where people and cultures meet and mix, where differences are respected, and where 
everyone is free to think and feel as they please (MP, 2013, pp. 3–4). 
The Green Party proclaims itself as a party that is highly supportive of international 
cooperation. They wish Europe to be one piece in a world of democracies, in which people 
move freely across borders and where people and countries trade and cooperate with one 
another. They favor intergovernmental cooperation where countries voluntarily participate in 
decision-making processes, but are also open to supranational decision-making with regards 
to issues of a global nature, such as cross-border environmental issues and the protection of 
basic human rights (MP, 2013, p. 33). 
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While supporting international cooperation and supranational decision-making when 
necessary, the party also believes in the subsidiarity principle and that decisions should be 
taken as closely as possible to the people affected by them. Because of their skepticism 
toward centralization, the party is critical of the EU and any developments toward a European 
federation. They would like to see the EU develop into a more flexible partnership in which 
member states, within reasonable limits, can determine for themselves which areas to 
cooperate on (MP, 2013, pp. 32–34). 
The Green Party’s holistic view on society and their emphasis on solidarity – not only with 
Swedes or Europeans, but with people everywhere – clearly fits into the view on identity 
found in the cosmopolitan model. When investigating their opinions on labor migration, it 
becomes clear that the party also have a cosmopolitan view on rights. In terms of migration, 
they argue that freedom of movement should be a human right. They envision a world without 
borders, where all people are free to move, but where no one is forced to flee. Rather than 
supporting the belief that countries have a right to choose its inhabitants, they believe that 
people should have the right to choose for where to live, work and follow their dreams. While 
underlining the many positive effects of migration – for individuals, for society and for the 
economy – the party highlights that increased global migration also places higher demands on 
states to better facilitate migration processes (MP, 2013, p. 36). 
Because the right to move is considered fundamental, the party wishes Sweden to be a 
country that is open for labor migrants. While they consider labor migration as a win-win 
situation for both the sending and receiving country, they underline that an open regulatory 
framework also requires national regulations and international collaboration to combat 
discrimination, poor working conditions and unscrupulous employers. Migrant workers, they 
emphasize, should have the same conditions in the labor market as other people living in 
Sweden (MP, 2013, p. 36). This clearly points to a cosmopolitan view on the rights 
dimension.  
3.2.4 The Centre Party 
Sweden’s Centre Party (Centerpartiet) contends that its policies are based on the fundamental 
assumption that all humans have the same rights and the same worth. For this reason, the 
party argues that each and every individual has the right and the ability to shape their own 
future, that making sure that everyone has the opportunity to realize their dreams is a 
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collective responsibility, that power should be kept close to the people, and that the planet and 
the ecosystem must be preserved, as it is the long-term foundation for freedom and prosperity. 
The party’s liberalism, they contend, is social, decentralist and green (C, 2013, p. 3). 
With regard to migration, the party aims for open borders, freedom of movement, and 
generous and humane refugee and immigration policies. They argue that for a political party 
whose values are based on the assumption that people have the same rights and the same 
worth, there can be no other logical position. Individuals’ right to determine their own path, 
they contend, does not stop at national borders. Because of this, the party wishes to extend the 
freedom of movement to countries outside of the EU – so that it encompasses the whole world 
(C, 2013, p. 19). 
As for integration, the Centre Party is a proponent of multiculturalism and believes diversity 
strengthens society. They argue that open borders breed tolerance and enable the exchange of 
knowledge between people living in different parts of the world. Sweden’s opportunities to 
develop, they maintain, rise with increased exchanges with the outside world. For these 
reasons, the party wants Sweden to be a country that welcomes immigrants as one would 
welcome a new neighbor (C, 2013, p. 19; C, 2014, p. 12). 
The party’s emphasis on individual freedom, equal opportunities for all and openness to the 
world suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple and nested identities. When 
presenting their principles, they do not focus on any aspect of Swedish society that 
differentiates Swedish citizens from citizens of other countries. Rather, their discussion on 
migration shows that the party believes diversity and multiculturalism to be an advantage for 
Sweden. With their focus on open borders and freedom of movement, the party appears to be 
embracing a sort of global sense of belonging. Their view on identity then, seems to fit with 
that of the cosmopolitan model of the EU. 
Discussing Europe, the party argues that there are challenges that necessitate a reform of the 
EU. The party’s vision is a more open, more green and more humane EU, in which diversity 
constitute a collective strength. The party contends that the EU must do fewer things, but do 
them better. In areas such as climate, free trade, and cross-border crime, the party argues in 
favor of meeting common challenges with more powerful common policies. In other areas – 
member states’ taxation, welfare, and social security systems being some – they maintain that 
the EU should not get involved (C, 2013, p. 20). With reference to the organization of the EU, 
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the Centre Party argues that the reigning principle should be that decisions are made as close 
to the citizens as possible – only cases that necessitate a joint decision should be made at EU 
level. They underline that the EU remains an intergovernmental cooperation between 
sovereign nations (C, 2013, p. 20). 
On the subject of welfare migration, the party refers to their belief that all people have the 
same rights and equal worth. They contend that the Centre Party, more markedly than any 
other Swedish party, took a stance against talk of “welfare tourism” and against introducing 
transitional arrangements following the 2004 enlargement of the EU, and successfully stood 
up for freedom of movement for all EU citizens (C, 2014, p. 4). The party is convinced that 
Sweden benefits from openness to the outside world. Swedish prosperity, they argue, depends 
on the existence of well trained workers – a demand for which at present cannot be met within 
Sweden’s borders. Policies that facilitate and encourage welfare immigration, they contend, 
will strengthen Sweden’s ability to compete internationally. Access to foreign expertise will 
also enable Swedish businesses to continue to grow. Consequently, the party wishes to make 
it easier for small and medium-sized businesses to recruit employees from other countries (C, 
2013, p. 19; C, 2014, p. 5). 
The Centre Party has a vision of a more humane EU and argues in favor of making it easier 
for labor migrants to come to Sweden. The party does not, however, explicitly mention 
whether access to welfare benefits should be the same for labor migrants working in Sweden 
as for Swedish citizens. While their belief that all humans are equal in terms of rights and 
worth suggests a cosmopolitan outlook on rights, their belief that each member state should 
be able to determine for themselves which welfare and social security policies to follow 
suggests a view that fits into the multinational federal model of the EU. 
3.2.5 The Liberal People’s Party 
The Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet liberalerna) contends that their mission is to fight for 
each individual’s right to shape his or her own life. The party believes that everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and argues that it is everyone’s responsibility 
to ensure that these rights are due to all. Moreover, they hold that it is the social-liberal 
mission to improve individuals’ chances in life by equalizing the conditions that are beyond 
the control of the individual. In addition, they maintain that respecting the equal worth of all 
means that everyone has the right to self-determination. Likewise, living in a liberal society 
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means to respect and tolerate different ways of living. The party sees the liberal community as 
something that is built and maintained by individuals working together. They argue that it 
must always be up to the individual to decide which community they want to belong to and be 
involved in. While tradition and cultural background may be important identity-builders, such 
factors must not be used as a pretext for denying or limiting a person’s choices. In terms of 
liberal values, the party contends that they are international and universal, and that freedom 
knows no national borders (FP, 2013, pp. 3–4). 
The party argues that Sweden should be an open country that welcomes new immigrants; a 
country where people – regardless of origin – work together to create a common future. 
Integration, they emphasize, is a mutual process that results in a sense of belonging. 
According to the party, language, employment, knowledge of the country and freedom from 
discrimination are the means and conditions necessary for this process is successful. The party 
contends that to fully belong to a community is to accept the country’s democratic institutions 
as legitimate and to abide by their rules. On the other hand, they stress that to belong to a 
community also means to consider its social relations to be a shared concern – to believe that 
everyone must participate in shaping the common future (FP, 2013, p. 18). 
Applying for citizenship, the party contends, is the most obvious way of signaling that one 
wishes to be a member of the Swedish community. The liberalist concept of citizenship, they 
argue, is an inclusive one. They underline that that which is considered Swedish – what might 
be thought of as the Swedish identity – is not static. Traditions, social norms and lifestyles 
will always change, and knowing this, they maintain, gives a sense of security in the face of 
new influences. While they wish Swedish to be the shared language, they also see the need for 
providing information in other languages for newly arrived immigrants. In order to become 
naturalized, the party wishes applicants to demonstrate a basic knowledge of Swedish and to 
have completed a mandatory introductory program on Swedish society (FP, 2013, pp. 18–19). 
The way the Liberal People’s Party describes society as something that is continually 
changing and dependent upon the individuals that at each given point in time constitute the 
community suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple affiliations. Although the 
party wishes citizenship applicants to have a basic knowledge of Swedish and Swedish 
society, the introduction of these requirements appear to be based on practical considerations 
rather than a belief that immigrants must conform to a static Swedish culture and identity. The 
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party’s view on identity, then, seems to fit well with the view found in the cosmopolitan 
model of the EU, in which all citizens are seen to have multi-level, nested identities.  
On the subject of European cooperation, the party underlines that the EU facilitates 
cooperation on a number of transnational issues that are best dealt with in concert with other 
European countries. The party wishes Sweden to participate fully in the EU and strive to be a 
part of the EU’s core. Their vision is a federal Europe that stands strong and united on issues 
where cooperation is needed, but that leaves other matters to be dealt with by the member 
states or the citizens themselves (FP, 2013, p. 32; FP, 2014, p. 12). 
The party establishes freedom of movement as the basis of European cooperation. Indeed, 
their vision is that freedom of movement be recognized as a human right worldwide. They 
emphasize that work and entrepreneurial immigration contribute to Sweden’s economic 
growth, and claims that foreign students and researchers strengthen Sweden’s position as a 
knowledge society. They contend that both temporary workers and new citizens should be 
made welcome, and argue in favor of making it easier for people who are able to support 
themselves to come to Sweden to look for work or to start a business. The party mentions 
several groups of people that should be allowed to apply for a residence permit on the basis of 
work, including third country nationals, students and asylum seekers (who FP contends 
should be allowed to change tracks and apply for a residence permit as a labor migrant rather 
than as an asylum seeker). As for relatives who immigrate to Sweden, they underline that the 
provider must be able to support his or her family (excepting refugees, people who have 
already been living in Sweden for a long time, and parents seeking reunification with minor 
children). In terms of welfare, the party contends that general welfare systems should 
facilitate safe movement. Increased intergovernmental coordination is desirable, they argue, in 
order to avoid that both people who move between countries as well as people who live in one 
country and work in another risk falling outside national benefit systems, for instance in case 
of unemployment or illness (FP, 2013, p. 17). 
With reference to globalization, the party argues that in order for Sweden to maintain its high 
level of ambition in terms of social welfare, a number of social liberal reforms are needed, 
including reforms that will make the labor market more dynamic. A social liberal work 
market, they contend, is characterized by high mobility in combination with robust social 
security systems. Foreign workers are seen to be an asset to the Swedish labor market, and for 
this reason, the party will defend foreigners’ opportunity to come to Sweden. In cases of 
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cheating, they state that work permits shall be revoked (FP, 2013, pp. 3, 15–16; FP, 2014, p. 
10). 
While the party expresses a highly positive view on work related migration – not only in the 
EU, but in the world at large – they do not mention whether labor migrants’ access to welfare 
benefits should be on par with that of Swedish citizens. They do express a wish for increased 
intergovernmental cooperation to ensure the wellbeing of people moving between countries 
and people working in a different country from the one they officially reside in, but do not 
offer any specifics as to which rights would follow from such a cooperation. That the party 
wants increased intergovernmental cooperation on – rather than supranational regulation of – 
welfare for labor migrants, suggests that the party believes welfare to be an issue that should 
be dealt with at the national level. From this, the party could subscribe either to the view on 
rights found in the nation-based or in the multinational federal model of the EU. As they are 
strong proponents of a federal EU, it is probable that they support the view on rights found in 
the multinational federal model of the EU.  
3.2.6 The Moderate Party 
People provide the point of departure for Sweden’s Moderate Party (Moderata 
samlingspartiet). Their policies, they contend, are based on liberal and conservative ideas that 
have proven to be successful in creating a prosperity that benefits everyone. The party 
believes that all humans have equal worth and an inherent ability to evolve. This ability, they 
claim, can only come into its own through freedom – and that is why freedom is the party’s 
most central value. With freedom, they argue, comes the right to be oneself and to take 
responsibility for one’s own choices, but also the obligation to respect other people’s choices 
(M, 2011, p. 2; M, 2013, p. 3). 
Discussing the Swedish community, the party states that they wish to build on values that 
many recognize as typically Swedish. Sweden, they contend, shall be a country that is 
modern, open and tightly knit. Moreover, they claim that composite and open-minded 
societies are more competitive than homogenous and exclusionary communities. Because the 
party believes that it is ultimately through work that people become a part of their new 
country and acquire knowledge of the language and the culture, the party argues in favor of an 
inclusive labor market. The Moderate Party emphasizes that a society that encourages 
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diversity must be clear on that which is common. That everyone has equal rights is a point on 
which they underline that there can be made no compromises (M, 2011, pp. 17–18). 
The Moderate Party contends that “swedishness” is an identity that is available to people who 
live and work in Sweden. They argue that to be Swedish is to be allowed to be who you are, 
to be allowed to be different and unique. To be Swedish also means that one welcomes and 
respects differences in the certainty that there is always more that unites people than divides 
people. Sweden, they argue, shall be characterized by tolerance for different ways of 
expressing one’s identity and one’s solidarity with others (M, 2011, pp. 17–18). The party’s 
view on what it is to be Swedish is closely connected with their vision of freedom. To be 
Swedish, they argue, is to be allowed to be oneself and in turn to respect others as they are.  
What binds Swedish society together in the picture the Moderate Party paints, is the 
recognition of freedom and equality as basic values. “Swedishness” is an identity that can be 
acquired, and one does therefore not have to be born in Sweden to be Swedish. Moreover, 
they contend that it is an identity that can be expressed in many different ways. The fact that 
the party stresses that people are free to choose how to express their Swedish identity and 
solidarity with others in the community, suggests that the party supports the view on identity 
found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU – that everyone have nested identities. 
Concerning the EU, the party contends that it provides the basic conditions for asserting 
Europe’s political and economic interests globally. The EU is also seen to be essential in 
increasing Swedish trade and competitiveness. Besides, the party argues that the EU is a 
necessary platform for resolving common problems, such as threats to the environment and to 
the stability of financial systems. In respect of the organization of the EU, the party supports 
the principle of subsidiarity. They contend that while it is important that European countries 
cooperate in areas where cooperation brings added value, it is just as obvious that the EU does 
not meddle in issues that member states are better equipped to handle themselves (M, 2013, 
pp. 40–41). 
The Moderate Party is an advocate of freedom of movement and a world without borders. The 
EU, they underscore, has enabled this vision to be carried out in Europe. The party supports 
the free movement of people, services, goods and capital in the EU, and argues in favor of 
deepening the internal market and facilitating exchange without borders and hassle. In 
addition, the party believes that it is important to expand the EU and to apply the principles of 
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openness and mobility to the surrounding world. They argue in favor of dismantling EU trade 
barriers against the outside world, and wish the EU to be proactive in persuading other 
countries to do the same. 
In terms of migration, the party argues that the tradition of being open to the outside world is 
one of the most Swedish traits of all. This openness, they contend, is all the more important in 
a globalized world. If Swedish companies are to remain competitive and generate jobs as well 
as tax revenue, the party emphasizes that they must be able to easily find and make use of 
expert skill. Changes made to facilitate labor migration are therefore seen to be of great 
importance. Besides, the party believes that the ability to be self-sufficient is the key to 
successful integration and that work to be the best form of integration policy. Because of this, 
they contend that efforts should be made to further strengthen newcomers’ opportunities to 
enter the labor market, to learn Swedish and to acquire knowledge about how Swedish society 
functions (M, 2013, p. 11). 
The Moderate Party does not mention whether or not they wish labor migrants to have the 
same rights in the Swedish labor market as Swedish citizens. This goes for labor migrants 
from the EU/EEA as well as labor migrants from outside the EU. Nor do they say whether 
access to, and the extension of, welfare benefits to labor migrants should be determined 
nationally. Given their strong support of the four freedoms of the internal market however, it 
seems likely that their view on rights matches that of the multinational federal model – that it 
is something that should be determined at the appropriate level of government. Whether it is 
an issue the party believes should be determined at central EU level or national member state 
level, however, remains unclear. 
3.2.7 The Christian Democrats 
The Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) contend that they work for a society where 
each person is given the opportunity to shape his or her own life and realize their full 
potential. This, they claim, is not something that a person does on their own. Rather, they 
argue that every person is dependent on the community to fully develop as an individual. The 
basis for the party’s policies is the belief that human beings are naturally rational, which they 
argue provides them with freedom and with “the capacity for choosing between good and 
evil. Human beings are morally aware and are in control of their own actions, making them 
morally responsible” (KD, 2001, p. 5). The party promotes a society that combines freedom 
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with community and social responsibility. A society based on ethics and values such as 
accountability, trust, honesty, moderation and humanity (KD, 2001, p. 5; KD, 2014, p. 4). 
With reference to integration, the party contends that there is an ethical base underlying 
Swedish society that creates favorable conditions for a multi-cultural society. While this 
ethical base is founded on Christian ethics and Western culture, they argue that it provides a 
uniting force for a society in which cultures, religions and lifestyles can live side by side to 
the benefit of all. In fact, they contend that “A multi-cultural society cannot function without 
a shared ethical base that is respected by both majority and minority groupings” (KD, 2001, p. 
49). A central part of this ethical base is the respect of other individuals’ and groups’ worth 
and distinctiveness. 
The party contends that people with an in-depth knowledge of their own culture are better 
equipped to meet other identities with an open mind: “Knowledge of how our Swedish 
historical background has led to the current community is part of the base that creates a strong 
individual identity... And it is a prerequisite for successful measures against xenophobia” 
(KD, 2001, p. 49). The party wishes to pursue integration policies that are characterized by 
what they call a “citizen perspective”, which means that “people shall have the freedom and 
possibility to organise as desired, such as by forming their own associations, start pre-schools 
and set up schools with ethnic base”. At the same time, they underline that immigrants must 
be guaranteed opportunities to learn Swedish and to acquire knowledge about Swedish society 
(KD, 2001, pp. 49–50). The party also wishes to allow dual citizenship, as they see citizenship 
not only as providing the basis for safety, rights and duties, but also as an identity marker 
signaling cultural and ethnic origin (KD, 2001, p. 17). 
While the Christian Democrats argue that there is an ethical base underlying Swedish society 
that creates favorable conditions for a multi-cultural society, they also underline that the 
ethical base consists of Christian and Western values. This ethical base, they contend, must be 
respected by majority and minority groupings. This implies a Eurocentric view, fitting well 
with that of the multinational federal model of the EU – where people are thought to have a 
national and a European identity.    
In the matter of European cooperation, the party contends that the EU is needed because 
individual citizens’ problems and opportunities to a great extent are dependent upon 
international conditions (KD, 2001, pp. 22–23). They underline that the peoples of the Union 
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are “united by common values based on our shared heritage from the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and from humanism” and that “The union today is based not only on these 
fundamental traditions, but also on convictions concerning the democratic system and human 
rights” (KD, 2001, p. 23). Regarding organization, the party maintains that the EU should 
have a constitution that lays out in detail how power is divided between the EU centrally and 
the member states, as well as a description of how decisions are to be made. Moreover, they 
argue that “It should be clearly established which areas are EU areas and which are not. It is 
necessary to define EU areas of authority in order to prevent unwelcome centralisation” (KD, 
2001, pp. 24–25). As a general rule, the party supports the subsidiarity principle. 
With reference to labor migration, the party contends that they would like to see more 
avenues into Sweden for people wishing to come there for work. They emphasize that labor 
migration is essential in order to meet the challenge of an aging population, both in Sweden 
and in Europe. They argue that foreign students who have studied in Sweden should be 
allowed to stay for at least six months to seek employment or start a business in Sweden. 
While the party would like to see more opportunities for foreigners looking for work to come 
to Sweden, they highlight that it is necessary to improve efforts to ensure that the system of 
labor immigration is not abused or exploited (KD, 2014, p. 22). 
While the party expresses a positive outlook on labor immigration and would like to make it 
easier for foreigners looking for work to come to Sweden, they do not mention whether labor 
migrants’ access to welfare should be equal to that of Swedish citizens. Given their emphasis 
on common European values and their contention that individual citizens’ rights are 
dependent upon international conditions, it seems probable that their view on rights falls 
within the multinational federal of the EU – namely that decisions pertaining to welfare 
should be taken at the appropriate level of government. Whether they believe this to be the 
central EU level or national member state level is unclear. 
3.2.8 The Sweden Democrats 
The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) describe themselves as a social conservative 
party with a nationalist ethos. In building the good society, they believe the preservation of 
the Swedish welfare state to be critical. They attribute the emergence of the welfare state, as 
well as the democratic and peaceful development of Swedish society, to a shared national 
identity. The party believes that this national identity must be safeguarded, and consequently 
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supports traditions and institutions that create and uphold a sense of community within the 
nation (SD, 2014). In the matter of governance, the party emphasizes that democracy emerged 
in a symbiosis with the nation-state. They see democracy to mean representative government, 
and express concern that representative government might be difficult to maintain in a state 
populated by several peoples, where there is no consensus on whom the members to be 
represented are. This becomes even more difficult, they contend, if the inhabitants speak 
different languages and there as a result is no common arena for debate. For these reasons, 
they see the existence of a common national and cultural identity in the population as one of 
the most fundamental cornerstones in a well-functioning democracy (SD, 2011, p. 6).  
Because of the importance of culture in creating a sense of community and the viability of the 
nation, the party opposes multiculturalism as a political idea and as a social system. They 
contend that it is irrelevant for them whether the aim is to create a new, diverse community or 
whether it is to create a multiculturalist community in which several national cultures coexist 
within one state. Both of these scenarios, they argue, will lead to a worsening of the social 
climate – with increased alienation, segregation and conflict, and less security and welfare, as 
the results. Instead of pursuing multiculturalist policies, the party wishes to resume the 
assimilation policies that were the norm in Sweden before 1975 (SD, 2011, p. 21). 
The nation has an important role in the party’s policies and after family, the nation is 
considered to be the most important and most natural human community. The party defines 
the nation in terms of loyalty, a shared identity, a shared language and a shared culture. The 
party separates citizenship in the Swedish state from membership in the Swedish nation, but 
affirms that all citizens are equal before the law and have the same rights and duties. The 
party claims that best thing for the Swedish community is if as large a portion as possible of 
the Swedish population also has a Swedish identity (SD, 2011, pp. 15–16). While they would 
like as many Swedish citizens as possible to have a Swedish identity, they contend that 
persons not born in Sweden can become a member of Swedish society if they actively choose 
Sweden and adopt what the party sees as the Swedish identity. In order to be naturalized, they 
argue that applicants, among other things, must have lived in Sweden for a longer period of 
time, have proven themselves loyal to Sweden during this time period, have learned to use 
Swedish and gained basic knowledge of Swedish history and society. Furthermore, they 
contend that Swedish citizens should not be allowed hold any other citizenship, and that only 
Swedish citizens should be allowed to vote in general elections (SD, 2014, p. 16). 
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The centrality of a shared national identity in the party’s beliefs and policies clearly indicates 
a view that resonates with the identity dimension found in the nation-based model of the EU. 
For the Sweden Democrats, nationality provides the main source of a Swede’s identity. A 
shared identity, a shared culture and a shared language, in addition to loyalty to the Swedish 
nation, is how the party differentiates Swedes from other group. Their view on identity is a 
unitary one which does not allow for nested identities or membership anywhere else than in 
the Swedish nation-state. The formal requirements that the party wishes to introduce in order 
for foreigners to become naturalized further strengthens this impression. 
The emphasis on identity and belonging is also evident in how the part considers Sweden’s 
relations with Europe and the world. The party regards the Swedish population to be, in 
descending order, a part of a Nordic, European, Western and global community. In order to 
preserve Swedish independence and democracy, they argue in favor of intergovernmental 
cooperation between sovereign nation-states. The party is highly skeptical of any form of 
supranational cooperation, including the EU. For this reason, they wish to hold a new 
referendum on Swedish membership of the EU – with the objective to leave the Union and 
return to intergovernmental cooperation (SD, 2011, p. 43; SD, 2014, p. 20). 
As regards labor immigration, the party sees it as a means to temporarily compensate for a 
poorly matched labor market and a method to resort to when the number of jobs temporarily 
exceeds the Swedish workforce. Because of this, the party wishes to abolish general labor 
migration in favor of a model where workers can obtain temporary resident permits linked to 
the needs in the labor market. Moreover, they contend that large long-distance migrations 
might have adverse effects on society as a result of the increased cultural heterogeneity, and 
therefore should be avoided (SD, 2011, p. 33). 
Considering that the party wishes to limit labor migration to Sweden, to adjust labor 
immigration according to the needs of the Swedish labor market, and to leave the EU and 
change the system through which labor migrants obtain residency, it seems fair to conclude 
that the Sweden Democrats would not like labor migrants to have the same rights as Swedish 
citizens in the Swedish labor market. This is a view that is strengthened by the fact that they 
argue in favor of restricting access to welfare benefits for migrant during their first few years 
in Sweden. The party’s view on rights, then, is firmly placed within the nation-based model of 
the EU, in which member states are free to determine the extension of welfare benefits. 
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3.2.9 Summary 
Comparing Sweden’s political parties’ views on identity and rights reveals an interesting 
pattern: All parties except from the Christian Democrats and the Sweden Democrats have a 
cosmopolitan view on identity – believing that people should be allowed to have nested 
identities. However, as table 4 (below) shows, only the Left Party, the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party, and the Green Party also have a cosmopolitan view on rights. The other 
parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity – the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party 
and the Moderate Party – all have a multinational federal view on rights. This inconsistency in 
placement on the two dimensions is interesting: While the parties emphasize openness and 
tolerance in their discussions of society, the policies they wish to pursue with reference to 
labor migration indicates that their views are in fact less tolerant. Given that the documents 
analyzed express the parties’ official values, the mismatch could reflect a desire on the part of 
the parties (for some reason or other) to appear more open than they in fact are.  
Among the parties placing in the multinational federal model on the rights dimension, there is 
some unclarity concerning whether welfare policies should be determined at EU level or at 
national level. While all parties express a positive opinion regarding free movement within 
the EU, the Centre Party and the Liberal People’s Party argue that access to welfare should be 
determined nationally. The Moderate Party and the Christian Democrats do not make a 
statement about this, but underline that it is important that there be a clear division of power 
in terms of which policy areas are EU areas and which are not.   
In terms of whether welfare migration is perceived to be a challenge or not, the Christian 
Democrats is the only party to express concern for the misuse of the system of labor 
immigration in the material analyzed. The Left Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, 
and the Green Party, on the other hand, express concern for social dumping. The remaining 
parties makes no reference to either labor immigration as welfare migration (i.e. as a threat to 
the Swedish welfare system) or as a problem of social dumping.  
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Table 3: Swedish political parties’ placement on the identity and rights dimensions    
 Nation-based 
Model 
Multinational Federal 
Model 
Cosmopolitan Model 
Identity Sweden Democrats 
(SD) 
Christian Democrats 
(KD) 
Left Party (V) 
Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) 
Green Party (MD) 
Centre Party (C) 
Liberal People’s Party (FP) 
Moderate Party (M) 
Rights Sweden Democrats 
(SD) 
Centre Party (C)* 
Liberal People’s Party 
(FP) 
Moderate Party (M) 
Christian Democrats 
(KD) 
Left Party (V) 
Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) 
Green Party (MD) 
*The Centre Party could potentially have a cosmopolitan view on rights.  
While several of the Swedish parties are critical of developments in the EU and see a need for 
a change of direction with regard to EU policies, only the Left Party expressly state that they 
are principally against Swedish membership of the Union. This does not, however, affect their 
cosmopolitan view on identity or rights. In fact, their opposition to EU membership is party 
caused by the belief that the EU places the interests of the internal market above labor law. 
That there are four parties that express a multinational federal view on rights, however, could 
be a result of generally positive attitudes toward Swedish EU membership.  
3.3 Denmark 
There are currently nine political parties represented in the Danish parliament. With regard to 
position on Danish membership of the EU, the Red-Green Alliance is the only party that 
wishes Denmark to leave the Union.   
3.3.1 The Red-Green Alliance 
The Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne) is a socialist, feminist and green 
party. Their values are based on the belief that all humans are equal and that no one should be 
oppressed on the basis of gender, sexuality or ethnicity. They maintain that in capitalist class 
societies there will always be inequality, poverty, destruction of nature, and extreme 
concentration of power over capital, which undermines democratically elected bodies. 
Accordingly, they wish to fundamentally change society by replacing capitalism with socialist 
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democracy. The socialist society they work for is one that is founded on democracy, equality 
and solidarity, and that is ecologically sustainable (Enhedslisten, 2014). Concerning the 
international community, the party encourages international solidarity and joint organization 
and activity across borders (Enhedslisten, 2011).  
When discussing society, the party’s focus is on socialist values rather than values that are 
specifically Danish. When separating a “we” from a “them”, the “we” is not Danish people, 
but rather socialists everywhere. Since the party clearly does not consider identity to be linked 
to nationality, it seems probable that they have a cosmopolitan view on the identity 
dimension.  
In terms of welfare, the Red-Green Alliance contends that the current system of welfare is 
under massive pressure due to the globalization of the economy – of which the EU is an 
expression. As regards labor migration, the party states that when the workforce is allowed 
and encouraged to flow freely between countries, it simply becomes more difficult to 
maintain collective schemes for everyone living in a given country. Moreover, they argue that 
increasing control over fiscal policy on the part of the EU means that the consideration for the 
internal market is placed above the interests of consumers, general health and the 
environment. This, they maintain, hinders the introduction of improvements that could 
counter the forces of the market. Because the party believes the EU to put pressure on 
democracy, in addition to letting capitalist forces run loose, they would like Denmark to leave 
the Union. They also support the dismantlement of the EU as well as the creation of a green, 
socialist and democratic cooperation scheme (Enhedslisten, 2014).  
With reference to foreign labor, the Red-Green Alliance maintains that thousands of Danish 
masons, carpenters and other tradesmen are unemployed because a growing group of 
employers sees fit to replace them with underpaid and unorganized workers imported from 
abroad. This is a problem not only for the individual craftsman, they contend, but also for 
society as a whole – as the exploitation of foreign labor results in great losses in tax revenue. 
While stating that they bid labor migrants welcome, they underline that it is an absolute 
requirement that the work is carried out in accordance with collective agreements, and that 
regulations on working condition, tax and VAT are observed (Enhedslisten, 2011, p. 8).  
The Red-Green Alliance underlines that any work done in Denmark must be carried out 
according to Danish collective agreements and work market regulations. With this in mind, it 
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seems probable that they also believe labor migrants should have the same rights as Danes 
when working in Denmark, indicating a cosmopolitan view also on rights.  
3.3.2 The Socialist People’s Party 
Denmark’s Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) maintains that their basis is a 
democratic and decentralist socialism, inspired by an undogmatic Marxist understanding of 
society. In addition, they highlight the Danish tradition for autonomy as well as the 
humanistic and cultural radical
17
 traditions that emphasize human freedom, expression and 
responsibility. The party wishes to bring about a fundamental change of Denmark, Europe 
and the world, based on community-based values. This they intend to do by bringing together 
the general public in an alliance pushing for changes that will expand democracy, strengthen 
feelings of community, promote equality, and ensure sustainability. The goal, they hold, is to 
establish a socialist society that on a sustainable foundation creates the maximum amount of 
welfare, prosperity, freedom, and opportunities for all (SF, 2012, pp. 1–3).  
The core values of the Socialist People’s Party are equality, community, safety and global 
responsibility (SF, 2011, p. 2). The party considers all people to be equal, and argue that the 
free and all-round development of individuals should be both the goal and the means for the 
development of society as a whole. Everyone should therefore have the freedom and 
opportunity to realize the life of their dreams, while respecting other people’s freedom, 
society and nature. In terms of how society is sustained, the party argues that social cohesion 
is about ensuring that the distance between people is not too large. Creating social cohesion, 
they contend, requires a high degree of equality, trust, safety and tolerance. Moreover, they 
maintain that social and economic rights are the glue of society (SF, 2012, pp. 1–3). 
With reference to the global community, the Socialist People’s Party maintains that socialism 
is international. They argue that social inequality, oppression, destruction of nature, 
inequality, and climate and environmental problems around the world are problems that 
concern everyone. The party therefore wishes to build alliances with like-minded people all 
over the world and show solidarity with oppressed people and their fight for democracy and 
human rights. This solidarity includes fighting imperialism and colonialism that hinder the 
                                                 
17
 The values most commonly associated with cultural radicalism are inter alia criticism of religion, 
opposition to social norms, criticism of Victorian sexual morality, anti-militarism and openness to new 
cultural input.  
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independent development of poor countries – the Socialist People’s Party opposes any kind of 
national, cultural or ethnic chauvinism (SF, 2012, p. 4).   
While not discussing immigration or integration in neither their election manifesto nor their 
statement of principles, the party’s emphasis on equality, freedom and tolerance suggests a 
view on identity that allows for different ways of being Danish and nested identities – a 
cosmopolitan view. This impression is strengthened when considering that high degrees of 
equality, trust and tolerance are seen to be essential in creating social cohesion and binding 
society together. That the party holds a cosmopolitan view on identity is further supported by 
the fact that they oppose any kind of national, cultural or ethnic chauvinism.  
With reference to the outside world, the Socialist People’s Party states that international 
cooperation is needed in the global development of international law, human rights, social 
rights, environmental protection, and peace. The party supports Danish membership of the 
EU, and wishes to develop the Union into a binding political and economic cooperation 
between independent states. The EU, they maintain, shall counter nationalism, secure the 
foundation for work, welfare and green growth, create cohesion across Europe, and be a 
political counterweight against unregulated capitalism (SF, 2012, p. 4).  
Regarding social dumping as a result of increased labor immigration, the party states that they 
will not accept underpayment and dangerous and illegal working conditions in the Danish 
labor market. They contend that they will work to secure Danish pay at all Danish 
workplaces. Moreover, they argue that conditions in the workplace must be equal, so that 
foreigners coming to Denmark to work are hired in accordance with the terms and conditions 
set by collective agreements. What it is about, they argue, is both preserving the unique 
Danish collective bargaining model and defending workers’ conditions (SF, 2011, p. 12).  
It is clear that the Socialist People’s Party believes that foreigners working in Denmark should 
be guaranteed equal pay and working conditions as Danish workers. While not explicitly 
saying anything about access to welfare, it seems safe to assume that welfare for labor 
migrants would follow from their being secured the same working conditions as Danish 
workers. The Socialist People’s Party, then, expresses a cosmopolitan view on rights.  
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3.3.3 The Social Democrats 
The founding values of Denmark’s Social Democrats’ (Socialdemokratiet [A]) are freedom, 
equality and solidarity. The party has three main objectives: First, to ensure that all 
individuals have the freedom and security to use their abilities and realize their dreams. 
Second, to ensure that people – regardless of social, religious or ethnic background – have the 
right and opportunity to live and to be an active citizen in a just and democratic society that is 
socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. Third, to spread democracy, 
democratic socialism, global equality, international solidarity, and security 
(Socialdemokraterne, 2011, pp. 4–5). 
With reference to society, the Social Democrats underline that all citizens have rights and 
duties and that everyone has a responsibility toward themselves, toward one another, and 
toward the community. Moreover, they argue that Danish communities have a responsibility 
in terms of being open and inclusive toward their surroundings – to meet other cultures by 
valuing diversity and demonstrating openness and tolerance. In this connection, the party 
underlines that just as a person with a strong identity has the courage to meet other people 
with an open mind, a society with a strong shared culture has the courage to meet the world. 
They underline that all Danes share Danish culture, and that Danish culture shapes Danish 
values, the Danish way of life, and provides Danes a point of reference in the world. The 
better one knows oneself, they argue, the better one is able to meet and understand other 
people’s culture (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, p. 12).      
The Social Democrats state that globalization and immigration challenges the common and 
fundamental values of Danish society. In meeting with other cultures, the Social Democrats 
wish to safeguard certain fundamental values, among which are civic participation, equality 
and equal treatment of men and women, democracy, as well as broadmindedness, tolerance 
and respect for that which is different. While they believe that ethnic minorities enrich Danish 
society, they emphasize that they do not wish Denmark to develop into a society where large 
populations live isolated from the rest of society with their own norms and values and without 
any incentive to take part in the commitments and the community that constitutes the 
foundation of Danish society. Integration is therefore considered crucial. However, the party 
underlines that integration is not related to religion, way of dressing or eating habits. Rather, it 
means that immigrants are able to function in society on par with others – with the duties, 
rights and opportunities that a democratic society is built upon. Because the Social Democrats 
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believe that it is important to know one’s own culture (in order to be open and fight 
intolerance and isolationism), they wish to strengthen the knowledge and understanding of 
Danish culture, language and history (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, p. 12).  
The Social Democrats’ emphasis on openness, broadmindedness and tolerance suggests a 
liberal, cosmopolitan view on identity. While they underline the importance of knowing one’s 
own culture and a voices a wish to strengthen the knowledge of Danish culture, language and 
history, they underline that integration is not about adopting everything Danish, but rather 
about participating in society. People belong, then, because they take part and contribute to 
society. People also belong because they respect and cherish the fundamental values of 
Danish society. These are, however, values that are universal to social democracies 
everywhere, and not to Denmark. 
On the topic of Europe, the party maintains that people’s welfare and influence should be at 
the center of European cooperation. They contend that many of the challenges of today cannot 
be solved by individual nation-states. This applies to all problems that cross national borders, 
such as unemployment, pollution, crime and terror. Challenges such as these, they argue, must 
be solved at either European or global level. Moreover, they maintain that a new world order 
is needed. Because they would like the EU to take on social leadership in the world economy, 
they argue in favor of a more integrated common European foreign and security policy. 
Europe, they claim, shall be built on a social market economy. This economy must remain 
competitive in order to create new jobs, but it must do so in a socially and environmentally 
sustainable manner. The Social Democrats believe that it is in Denmark’s interest to 
participate fully in the EU. They emphasize that a stronger EU that is capable of taking action 
is not a threat to the welfare society, but rather a precondition for its long-term survival 
(Socialdemokraterne, 2011, pp. 13–14).  
With reference to welfare tourism, the Social Democrats states that foreigners are welcome in 
Denmark if they come to work under Danish conditions – but not if they come solely for the 
purpose of exploiting Danish welfare services. With reference to foreigners’ right to receive 
child benefit when working in Denmark, they maintain that the party is working (in the EU) 
for the indexation of child benefit, so that the check workers receive correspond to the 
economic conditions of their home country. At the same time, they underline that they guard 
the ability to move freely and contend that the ability to work and live in a different country 
than one’s own is an essential part of European cooperation. Freedom of movement, they 
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contend, has created many jobs in Denmark – with the result that thousands of families have 
jobs to go to and the ability to be self-sufficient. The rules regulation freedom of movement, 
the party maintains, are rules that Denmark profits from. While it is important that other EU 
countries follow these rules, it is likewise important that Denmark lives up to its commitments 
and provides people with the services they have a legal right to (Socialdemokraterne, 2015a). 
With reference to social dumping, the Social Democrats point to problems with poor wages 
and working conditions, in particular for Eastern European workers. While these workers are 
paid better than they would be at home, the party underlines that the acceptance of these 
conditions has direct consequences for Danish workers who follow the rules of the Danish 
labor market. The party therefore works against social dumping (Socialdemokraterne, 2015b).   
In terms of welfare for labor migrants, it is clear that the Social Democrats feel bound by the 
rules and regulations that guarantee foreigners rights when working in Denmark. While they 
believe that it is right that these workers have rights, they explicitly refer to ”welfare tourism” 
and underline that they will not accept foreigners who come to Denmark with the objective of 
exploiting the Danish welfare system. With reference to social dumping, they stress that the 
exploitation of foreign labor has negative effects on Danish workers and the Danish labor 
market. When considering that the party supports European regulation on labor migration, a 
view on rights that matches that of the multinational federal model of the EU seems probable. 
This impression is strengthened by the fact that while the party supports EU rules, they also 
wish to establish a system of indexation of child benefit – in effect treating national and 
foreign citizens differently. This is a point of view which does not fit into the cosmopolitan 
model – in which people’s rights are seen to be universal.  
3.3.4 Venstre 
Denmark’s Venstre (full name Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti) has a liberal view of 
humanity, and believes that people thrive when they are free. At the same time, they argue 
that with freedom comes responsibility. Their view on freedom then, posits responsibility 
onto individuals – who must take responsibility for their own life, but who also have a shared 
responsibility for other people and for the community. Venstre maintains that when the 
individual is given the greatest possible freedom to strive after a good life, resources that can 
benefit society are created. They emphasize that there is no inherent contradiction between 
freedom and community. Rather, they contend that the strongest communities are those where 
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people voluntarily have joined forces to solve a puzzle or cultivate an interest. Venstre also 
maintains that broadmindedness is an important part of the liberal mentality. 
Broadmindedness in their view means that while you might have a firm conviction that you 
are willing to fight for, you are also willing to fight for the right of others to have a different 
opinion (Venstre, 2006, pp. 3–4). 
Discussing Danish society, Venstre ascertains that it is based on values founded on Christian 
beliefs as well as a number of rights and principles such as individual freedom, care for the 
weakest members of society, equality before the law, equality between the sexes, limited 
government, democracy, independent courts, freedom of speech, and a separation of religion 
and politics. It is by virtue of these values, they argue, that individuals are free to choose their 
own way of life – while respecting others’ right to do the same. The freedom to determine 
one’s own path means that while one is free to join forces with others in all kinds of voluntary 
communities, one is equally free to leave these communities (Venstre, 2006, pp. 9–10).  
As for the outside world, Venstre underlines that in the open and free meeting with foreign 
cultures, Danes should be aware that their worldview stems from Denmark and that which is 
Danish. The party argues that it is important that Danes know their cultural roots so as to 
avoid becoming victims of manipulation or ideological fashions. With regard to citizenship, 
Venstre maintains that everyone who wishes to make an effort is welcome to come live and 
work in Denmark. As for naturalization, the party argues that foreigners who wish to apply 
for citizenship (with the rights that follows from citizenship status) must master Danish, know 
Danish society, Danish culture and history as well as prove that they are able to contribute to 
society and provide for themselves (Venstre, 2006, p. 10). 
In their discussion on meetings with foreign cultures, the party gives quite a bit of emphasis to 
that which is Danish, suggesting a unitary view on identity – fitting into the nation-based 
model of the EU. This view is strengthened by the party’s insistence that citizenship 
applicants must master Danish and have knowledge about Danish society, culture and society.   
On the subject of European cooperation, Venstre establishes the EU as a union of independent 
European nations that have determined to solve a variety of tasks together. They emphasize 
the importance of individual Europeans’ ability to freely choose where to live, work and 
travel in Europe (Venstre, 2006, pp. 38, 42). As for organization of the EU, Venstre argues in 
favor of the subsidiarity principle. They also highlight the need for a clear division of labor in 
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the EU; member states should seek common solutions on issues where cooperation offers 
obvious advantages. While the EU should deal with transnational issues such as terror, 
international crime, and the environment, they contend that the EU should not get involved in 
areas such as social or cultural policy. Venstre would like Denmark to be an initiator in, and a 
fully integrated member of, the EU. Accordingly, they argue that Denmark should join the 
Eurozone as well as participate fully in the common security and defense policy and judicial 
cooperation, as well as in cooperation on asylum and immigration policy where this is 
compatible with Danish policy (Venstre, 2006, pp. 42–43). In the matter of labor migration, 
Venstre argues that the Danish labor market should be open to foreign labor that lives up to a 
number of objective requirements related to education and the ability to provide for oneself 
(Venstre, 2006, p. 10). 
Venstre does not give any information concerning labor migrants’ rights when working in 
Denmark. Considering their position that the EU should not get involved in the member 
states’ social policy, it would appear that the party believes social rights, including welfare, 
should be determined by the individual member states. Moreover, their emphasis on labor 
immigrants’ ability to provide for themselves indicates that the party is not opposed to 
differential treatment of labor migrants in terms of rights – suggesting a nation-based view.  
3.3.5 The Danish Social Liberal Party 
The Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre (Danmarks social-liberale parti) [B]) 
places their faith in free and responsible people who act in solidarity with other people. 
Freedom and responsibility, they argue, are inextricably linked. They underline that while 
society creates the framework for the individual’s life and freedom, society is also dependent 
upon individuals fulfilling their potential, so that it can develop and be versatile. As for the 
society the party strives after, it is a society in which people are free to believe, think and act 
as they please. It is a society that is sustainable, both environmentally and economically. 
Moreover, they wish to strengthen democracy so that everyone has the same right and 
opportunity to exert influence. Democracy, they contend, presupposes that the economic and 
social disparity between people is not too great. Additionally, they will work to spread respect 
for human rights, uphold liberty of mind and fight intolerance (RV, 1997).  
With reference to international commitments, the party maintains that the same principles that 
are valid for their policies in Denmark are valid for their international policies. They 
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emphasize that Denmark is a part of the global community, and that this community shares a 
responsibility for the global environment and resources, human rights, security and welfare. 
Every individual, they argue, should be secured basic social, cultural and democratic rights, 
regardless of ethnic background, gender, faith or governmental affiliation. Furthermore, they 
contend that they will work for disarmament and against isolationism, militarism and 
nationalism (RV, 1997).  
The party’s social liberal values of freedom, responsibility and solidarity are values that lend 
themselves well to a cosmopolitan view of identity. The party makes no mention of any 
notions that separates a Danish “we” from a foreign “them” in their statement of principles. 
Rather, they underscore tolerance and broadmindedness as values they wish to uphold. It 
would therefore appear that the party has a cosmopolitan view of identity, allowing for nested 
identities. That they consider Denmark to be a part of a global community that has a 
responsibility toward people everywhere, further strengthens this impression (RV, 1997).  
In the matter of the EU, the party wishes to further develop the union as a binding cooperation 
between sovereign states (RV, 1997). In order to take full advantage of the binding and 
solidary community that the EU constitutes, the party argues in favor of bringing Denmark 
into the Union’s core. The party wishes to change the Danish judicial reservation into a so-
called opt-in arrangement, but in the long run they wish to do away with the judicial 
reservation as well as the defense and euro opt-outs (RV, 2015a). Discussing the Danish labor 
market, the party argues in favor of increased use of international labor. They believe 
foreigners who come to Denmark are a resource that must be utilized, and not a nuisance that 
must be avoided. They argue that talented and hard-working labor migrants are already 
contributing to research, development and production in Denmark, which in turn helps create 
work for Danes. They believe that there will be an even greater need for foreigners in the 
Danish labor market in the future. Accordingly, they wish to give Danish businesses the best 
possible conditions for recruiting international workers (RV, 2015b). 
In respect of rights, the party makes no mention of social dumping. Nor do they mention 
whether labor migrants’ working in Denmark should have the same access to welfare as 
Danish workers. Their positive attitude toward labor migration and their wish to make 
Denmark attractive to labor migrants, however, suggest that they at minimum support the 
view on rights found in the multinational federal model of the EU. Taking into account how 
the party stresses that Denmark is a part of the global community and that the same principles 
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that are valid for their policies in Denmark are valid for their international policies, it seems 
more likely that they have a cosmopolitan view on rights  
3.3.6 The Liberal Alliance 
Denmark’s Liberal Alliance (Liberal Allianse) places individual freedom first. The society 
they wish to create is a society characterized by open-mindedness, a society that has room for 
many different points of view. Humans, they argue, need elbow room. They emphasize that 
free individuals are different from one another, and contend that there is an intrinsic value in 
being allowed to seize the opportunity, to fight for personal success, and to put a mark on 
one’s surroundings. The Liberal Alliance places the ideal of freedom over equality, and 
argues in favor of fewer rules and restrictions on the part of the state. A free market without 
undue government interference, they claim, guarantees that people can develop themselves, 
experiment and gain new knowledge (LA, 2015a).   
With reference to open-mindedness, the Liberal Alliance contends that they believe that 
people should be allowed to do as they please and express themselves in many different 
manners. People should be allowed to seek happiness in their own way, and choose to live 
their lives and realize their dreams either by themselves or together with others (LA, 2015a). 
The party’s emphasis on personal freedom and open-mindedness suggests a cosmopolitan 
view on identity, allowing for multi-layered, nested identities.  
As for Denmark’s place in the international community, the Liberal Alliance contends that 
they would like Denmark to be a society that is open and involved in the outside world (LA, 
2015a). Concerning the EU, the party contends that the Union has developed in a negative 
direction where growth, progress and dialogue has been replaced by rules, bureaucracy, 
redistribution and centralism. For this reason, the party would like the EU to regress to what it 
sees as the EU’s true goal – namely to ensure freedom for its citizens, business, civil society 
and member states. They contend that the EU should focus on developing the internal market 
further, and also ensure that the rules regulating the free movement of labor, goods, and 
services is adequately flexible. Furthermore, the party would like to abolish Denmark’s opt-
out from the CSDP (LA, 2013, p. 12).    
The Liberal Alliance also argues that the EU should focus on the internal market and not get 
involved in Danish labor market policies (LA, 2013, p. 12). They contend that foreigners who 
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wish to contribute positively to Danish society and whose manpower is needed in the Danish 
labor market should be allowed to work in Denmark and feel welcome (2015a; 2013, p. 6). 
However, they underline that foreigners who come to Denmark must be able to provide for 
themselves. Denmark, they maintain, is neither able to, nor should, provide social services for 
“the whole world”. Accordingly, they argue that foreigners should pay for themselves the first 
few years that they live in Denmark and not have access to social benefits or publicly paid 
health care (LA, 2013, pp. 6, 12; LA, 2015a, LA, 2015b). This, in addition to the party’s 
position that the EU should stay out of Danish labor market policies, quite clearly indicates a 
view on rights that fits with the nation-based model of the EU.   
3.3.7 The Conservative People’s Party 
The Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti) describe themselves as a 
party of responsible people who love their native country, with its culture, traditions and 
history, and who wishes Denmark to be a free society where individuals take responsibility 
for themselves and their loved ones. The party maintains that freedom and responsibility goes 
hand in hand. They argue that in order to be able to take responsibility for one’s one life, one 
must be free to do so. For this reason, they argue in favor of less political interference in 
people’s day to day lives (KF, 2012, p. 8).  
When discussing Danish society, the party gives great emphasis to Danish culture and 
institutions such as Christianity and the Danish constitution. They emphasize that today’s 
society is the product of millennia of history in which Danish culture has developed in 
interplay between internal and external influences. Denmark, they maintain, constitutes the 
framework for the Danish national community, culture and language. Moreover, the party 
argues that it is these cornerstones that allow Denmark to meet other cultures with open arms 
(KF, 2012, p. 9). 
As to immigration, the party contends that they consider cultural integration to be just as 
important as economic integration. Danish traditions, they argue, constitute the culture that 
immigrants shall be integrated into. Accordingly, they argue that it is not enough to obey 
Danish law; immigrants must also have a basic understanding of Danish history, culture and 
language. The kind of cohesiveness this will create, they argue, will by itself contribute to 
greater mutual understanding. Denmark, they argue, must not become a divided society (KF, 
2012, p. 27). The party’s emphasis on Danish culture, tradition and history, not least with 
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reference to integration policy, suggests a unitary view on identity – in which nationality is 
the main ingredient. There is thus little doubt that the party has a view of identity that fits into 
the nation-based model of the EU.     
In the matter of European cooperation, the Conservative People’s Party maintains that the EU 
is indispensable in terms of ensuring free trade between European countries and with regard 
to furthering common European interests toward the rest of the world. They underline that 
their point of departure is that the EU is a union of independent states in which the 
sovereignty of each nation-state is respected. With reference to decision-making, the party 
argues in favor of the subsidiarity principle. They are critical of what they see to be 
unnecessary centralization and bureaucracy, as well as the broad interpretation by the ECJ of 
the common EU rules (KF, 2012, p. 39). 
With reference to labor migration, the Conservative People’s Party holds that as a small and 
open society, Denmark is dependent upon foreigners coming to Denmark to contribute to the 
Danish society – either for a period of time or to become a permanent member of the Danish 
society. For this reason, the party contends that it is important to ensure an efficient 
processing of work permit applications for people who can prove that they are willing and 
able to contribute positively to the Danish society. Like the Liberal Alliance, however, they 
highlight that Denmark is not the world’s welfare office. People who want to settle in 
Denmark, they argue, must be able to support themselves and their families, so as not to 
become a burden on the public purse (KF, 2012, p. 27). Moreover, they underline that the EU 
cannot and should not accommodate for all the differences in Europe in terms of public 
services and labor market models. In order to avoid that people come to Denmark take 
advantage of the Danish welfare system, they argue that Danish rules for services such as 
student grants and loans and child benefit must be organized in a way that prevents them from 
being undermined by EU regulations on inter alia workers’ rights and social schemes (KF, 
2015).       
While the Conservative People’s Party acknowledges that there are EU rules that affect EU 
citizens’ rights when working (or studying) in Denmark, this is something that they express 
strong dissatisfaction with. This suggests that they would like Denmark to be free to 
determine foreigners’ access to, and the extension of, welfare benefits. It therefore seems safe 
to assume that the party has a nation-based view on rights.  
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3.3.8 The Danish People’s Party 
The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) contends that their aim is “to assert Denmark's 
independence, to guarantee the freedom of the Danish people in their own country, and to 
preserve and promote representative government and the monarchy”. The party desires “a 
country of free Danish citizens empowered to fend for themselves and decide their own fate. 
However, the state is also bound to render support to those Danes in need”. In addition to a 
responsibility toward one another, the party contends that Danes are bound by their cultural 
heritage, of which the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church, in addition to the monarchy, is an 
important institution. They argue that because the country is founded on Danish cultural 
heritage, this culture must be preserved and strengthened:  
This culture consists of the sum of the Danish people's history, experience, beliefs, 
language and customs. Preservation and further development of this culture is crucial 
to the country's survival as a free and enlightened society.  
(DF, 2002)   
With reference to immigration, the Danish People’s Party argues that “Denmark is not an 
immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a 
multiethnic society”. Moreover, they claim that “Denmark belongs to the Danes and its 
citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which 
develops along the lines of Danish culture”. However, they contend that it ought to be 
possible to absorb foreigners into Danish society as long as it does not risk Danish security or 
democracy (DF, 2002). As for integration, the party argues that foreigners must adapt to 
Danish values, norms and behavior. In order for them to do so, the party argues that 
immigrants must be required to learn the language, get an education and contribute to society 
by working (2009, p. 156). Given the party’s emphasis on Danish culture and resistance to 
immigration, as well as their thoughts on integration, it is clear that the party supports the 
view on identity found in the nation-based model of the EU – namely that nationality provides 
the main source of people’s identities.  
As regards Europe, the Danish People’s Party supports an open and democratic cooperation 
between free and independent countries in Europe. The party does not, however, support any 
attempts at creating a European federation (which they argue has been the objective of the 
existing EU treaties). The party therefore wishes Denmark to keep the four Danish opt-outs. 
Moreover, they argue that EU functions should be restricted to the following: tasks that large 
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majorities in the member states believes should be solved through the EU, tasks whose 
transnational nature necessitates common solutions, and tasks for which there are decisive 
economy of scale for common solutions (DF, 2009, p. 60).   
The Danish People’s Party does not discuss labor migration within the EU specifically. 
Generally, they have a restrictive attitude on the import of labor. They underline that 
immigration and welfare are inextricably linked, and that there are enormous costs connected 
with the uncontrolled immigration of foreigners that are either unable to or unwilling to 
contribute to society. They argue that should immigration prove to be beneficial to the Danish 
and not only put extra pressure on public spending (like heretofore), it is imperative that the 
migrants exhibit the behavior of and meet the same requirements as Danes. The party is, 
however, positive toward controlled immigration of educated, talented people who come to 
Denmark to work. These people, they argue, contribute to the development of the Danish 
welfare state, and not to the impoverishment of the country (DF, 2009, pp. 136, 156). Given 
the party’s restrictive view on immigration combined with their skepticism toward the EU, it 
seems probable that they support a nation-based view on rights – allowing member states to 
determine for themselves who has access to, as well as the extension of, welfare.  
3.3.9 The Alternative 
The Alternative (Alternativet) is a political party whose focus is on the sustainable transition 
of Denmark. This transition, they argue, “is characterized by the courage to imagine a 
radically different future, both for Denmark and for the rest of the world”. The Alternative 
wishes for a transition that is at once environmentally, socially and economically sustainable.  
The time for stop-gap measures is over. Minor adjustments and the treatment of 
symptoms are no longer enough. What we need instead are new forms of cooperation, 
new decision-making processes and a new approach to the allocation of global 
resources, where economic growth and material consumption are no longer the goal 
of everything. The Alternative is therefore seeking to redefine the established 
perception of welfare and value.  
(Alternativet, 2013) 
The party contends that the world is in need of nations that take sustainable transitions 
seriously and that leads the way for vibrant, creative and inclusive societies. This, they argue, 
is the society of the future. They contend that “Sustainability is about being wise. It is about 
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long-term thinking and taking responsibility through action. It is about respect and 
cooperation between people and nature, as well as amongst people” (A, 2013).  
With reference to social sustainability, the Alternative sees diversity and variation as societal 
advantages. They believe that “people are at their best when they are motivated, engaged, and 
have the opportunity to develop their talents and make a difference without having to 
compromise [sic] who they are”. Because they believe different people want to live different 
lives, they wish to build a society that responds to diversity. Moreover, they would like all 
people to be able to achieve a good life, and contend that “human well-being is fundamental 
for a socially sustainable society” (A, 2013).   
It is clear that the Alternative has a cosmopolitan view on identity. Considering that they 
believe diversity to be beneficial for society, and that people should be allowed to be who 
they are, suggests an attitude that allows for multiple, nested identities. Furthermore, their 
wish to lead a sustainable transition not only in Denmark, but also in the world, suggests that 
they consider themselves as humans belonging to the global community. They make no 
mention of any notions that can be interpreted as purely Danish and there is no separation of a 
“we” from a “them”. As a recently established party, the Alternative makes no mention of 
labor migration. Given their extremely open attitude towards all humans and the world, 
however, it seems fair to assume that they would also hold a cosmopolitan view on rights.   
3.3.10 Summary 
A comparison of the Danish political parties (table 5) reveals that while six parties have a 
cosmopolitan view on identity, nearly as many (four) have a nation-based view. However, 
two of the parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity – the Social Democrats and the 
Liberal Alliance – place in the multinational federal and the nation-based model when it 
comes to rights. The Liberal Alliance is a particularly interesting case, as the party has a 
cosmopolitan view on identity but a nation-based view on rights. The Social Democrats 
express a grudging acceptance of the EU setting the rules for labor migrants’ rights, and is 
consequently placed in the multinational federal dimension on rights. The remaining seven 
parties all show an inner consistency in terms of placement on the two dimensions.   
As regards whether welfare migration is perceived to be a problem or not, a majority of 
Danish parties (the Red-Green Alliance, the Social Democrats, the Liberal Alliance, the 
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Conservative People’s Party and the Danish People’s Party) express concern that welfare 
migration poses a threat to the Danish welfare system. While three of these parties have a 
nation-based view on rights, the two others have a multinational federal and a cosmopolitan 
view on rights. The Red-Green Alliance also expresses concern for social dumping as a result 
of the free flow of labor within the EU, but social dumping is discussed in a manner that 
suggests that they consider it to be primarily a problem for Danish workers who might lose 
their jobs to underpaid foreign workers from Eastern Europe. The Socialist People’s Party is 
the only other party that discusses problems of social dumping, and they appear to be doing so 
with the labor migrants’ well-being in mind.    
Table 4: Danish political parties’ placement on the identity and rights dimensions    
 Nation-based 
Model 
Multinational 
Federal Model 
Cosmopolitan Model 
Identity Conservative 
People’s Party 
Danish People’s 
Party 
Venstre 
 Red-Green Alliance 
Socialist People’s Party 
The Alternative 
Social Democrats 
Danish Social Liberal Party 
Liberal Alliance 
Rights Liberal Alliance 
Conservative 
People’s Party 
Danish People’s 
Party 
Venstre 
Social Democrats 
 
Red-Green Alliance 
Socialist People’s Party 
The Alternative 
Danish Social Liberal Party 
 
As the only party that explicitly states that they are against Danish membership in the EU and 
would like the EU to be dismantled, the Red-Green Party nonetheless have a cosmopolitan 
view on both dimensions.   
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The foregoing analysis has been aimed at answering the research question, namely which 
perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Scandinavia, 
and which model of the EU these perceptions reflect. With reference to the first part of the 
question, the analysis has shown that there exists a scale related to the problem definition of 
welfare migration within the context of the EU/EEA: At one end of the scale, welfare 
migration is seen to be a challenge to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the 
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other end of the scale, welfare migration is not considered a problem at all. Instead, labor 
migration within the EU/EEA is seen to be problematic because it threatens workers’ rights 
and leads to social dumping.  
The above analysis has also shown that this scale of concern for welfare migration at one end 
and concern for social dumping at the other corresponds with the scale made up by the three 
models, with the nation-based model at one end, the multinational federal model in the 
middle, and the cosmopolitan model at the other end. The parties that are most concerned 
about welfare induced migration and its effects on national welfare systems are also the 
parties that most strongly express a nation-based (in some cases a multinational federal) view 
on identity and rights. Similarly, the parties that most strongly express cosmopolitan views on 
the two dimensions are also the parties that are concerned about labor migrants being 
subjected to poor wages and working conditions.        
There are some rather significant differences between the three countries regarding whether 
welfare migration is perceived to be a problem or not. While there is the above-mentioned 
trend in terms of model placement and concern for welfare induced migration vs. social 
dumping, it is clear that the issue of welfare migration is not of the same interest in the three 
countries. While there are three parties in Norway and five parties in Denmark voicing 
concerns about labor migrants’ misuse of national systems of welfare, there is only one 
Swedish party expressing concern about this. In both Norway and Denmark there are also 
parties placing in the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions (the Labour Party and the 
Liberal Party in Norway, and the Red-Green Alliance), but nonetheless express concern about 
labor migration affecting the sustainability of the welfare state. This suggests that welfare 
migration is perceived to be less of an issue in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark. 
With reference to social dumping, all Norwegian parties placing within the cosmopolitan 
model express concern that labor migrants form the EEA suffer from wages and working 
conditions that are not on par with that of the Norwegian labor market standards. In Sweden, 
it is the three parties that place within the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions that 
express concern about social dumping. In Denmark it is really only one party that expresses a 
concern for social dumping (in terms of having an adverse effect on labor migrants’ living 
circumstances, as opposed to having an adverse effect on Danish workers who might lose 
their jobs), namely the Socialist People’s Party – also placing within the cosmopolitan model 
on both dimensions. While welfare migration appears to be less of an issue in Sweden, 
92 
 
concerns about social dumping is just as important in Sweden as in Norway. Social dumping 
is, however, less of an issue in Denmark, where concerns about welfare migration on the 
whole appear to be more important.  
As regards the second part of the research question, which views on welfare migration the 
existing perceptions of welfare migration reflects, there are some significant differences 
between the three countries (see table 6 below). The cosmopolitan view on identity dominates 
in both Norway and Sweden. In Denmark, the parties’ views on identity are more evenly 
divided between the cosmopolitan and the nation-based model. The multinational federal 
view on identity is the least common, supporting the no-demos theorists’ argument that there 
is no common European people. However, when parties do express a multinational federal 
view on either identity or rights, they often give emphasis to common European values or 
history. In the same vein, the parties expressing a nation-based view on identity and rights 
often use arguments that reveal a classical understanding of citizenship – namely that 
democracy is only possible within the nation-state. The parties expressing cosmopolitan views 
are in general less concerned with identity, and more with equality, both in terms of worth and 
with regard to rights.  
In terms of parties’ inner consistency with regard to placement on the two dimensions, there is 
a noticeable difference between the three countries. While all parties in Norway place in the 
same model on both dimensions, there are four parties in Sweden and two parties in Denmark 
that place differently on the two dimensions. A common denominator between these parties 
are that they all express a more open and tolerant view on identity than on rights. The parties 
are all also for Swedish and Danish EU membership. This difference in placement on the two 
dimensions could reflect a desire to appear more open and tolerant than they in fact are. That 
there is more consistency among Norwegian political parties could be due to the fact that 
Norway is not a member of the EU. It could also be due to the fact that Norwegian parties 
publish political programs consisting of both values and desired political actions at the same 
time (i.e. before parliamentary elections), and it is primarily these documents that are 
analyzed here.  
A small puzzle is related to the parties that place in the cosmopolitan model on both 
dimensions, but that nonetheless are against EU membership. A plausible explanation for this 
could be that these parties believe the social dimension of the EU to be underdeveloped and 
that their populations would suffer from membership in the EU. As for the parties placing 
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within the multinational federal model on the rights dimension, there is some indication that 
several of these parties are willing to accept that labor migrants’ are given access to welfare 
because they are committed to European cooperation through the EU/EEA.  
Table 5: Scandinavian political parties’ placement on the identity and rights dimensions  
 Nation-based 
Model 
Multinational 
Federal Model 
Cosmopolitan Model 
N
O
R
W
A
Y
 
Identity 
Centre Party (Sp) 
Progress Party 
(Frp) 
Conservative Party 
(H) 
Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Labour Party (Ap) 
Christian Democratic 
Party (KrF) 
Liberal Party (V) 
Green Party (MDG) 
Rights 
Centre Party (Sp) 
Progress Party 
(Frp) 
Conservative Party 
(H) 
Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Labour Party (Ap) 
Christian Democratic 
Party (KrF) 
Liberal Party (V) 
Green Party (MDG) 
S
W
E
D
E
N
 
Identity 
Sweden Democrats 
(SD) 
Christian Democrats 
(KD) 
Left Party (V) 
Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) 
Green Party (MD) 
Centre Party (C) 
Liberal People’s Party 
(FP) 
Moderate Party (M) 
Rights 
Sweden Democrats 
(SD) 
Centre Party (C) 
Liberal People’s 
Party (FP) 
Moderate Party (M) 
Christian Democrats 
(KD) 
Left Party (V) 
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In this study, placement on the rights dimension is considered to more accurately reflect a 
party’s perception of welfare migration. This is because the rights dimension is directly 
related to a party’s thoughts on labor immigration and the policies they accordingly wish to 
pursue. Analyzing all parties’ placement with this in mind, it is still the cosmopolitan model 
that dominates in Norway. In Sweden, however, there are now as many parties expressing a 
multinational federal view as a cosmopolitan view. In Denmark, no one model dominates, as 
the parties are evenly divided between the cosmopolitan and the nation-based model, with 
only one party expressing a multinational federal view.  
With a view to explain these differences, it is natural to consider the three countries’ 
affiliation with the EU. Given that Norway is not a member, Denmark is a member but holds 
several important opt-outs, and Sweden is a fully integrated member, one could expect 
Norwegian parties to be the most concerned about welfare migration, Swedish parties to be 
the least concerned, and Danish parties to be somewhere in-between. While form of affiliation 
could be a plausible explanation for Swedish parties’ placements (with more Swedish parties 
placing in the multinational federal model as Sweden is fully integrated in the EU) as well as 
the Swedish disregard for welfare migration, it does not explain why the cosmopolitan model 
dominates in Norway. Nor does it account for Danish parties’ placement in the models or the 
outspread concern for welfare migration found among Danish parties. These differences do, 
however, reflect the general debate on immigration, as well as immigration policies (in terms 
of openness vs. closedness), in the three countries.    
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4 Conclusions 
This thesis has taken the ongoing European discussion on welfare migration as its starting 
point. It is a debate that is particularly interesting because there is uncertainty among 
researchers whether welfare actually is a determinant of migration within the EU/EEA. 
Consequently, there is ample opportunity for parties to color the concept of welfare migration 
according to their fundamental political beliefs. This study has had an exploratory objective - 
it has sought to discover, map and describe the perceptions of welfare migration that exist 
among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. As such, it has been a first attempt 
at understanding the ideas and perceptions that come to the fore in one of the major debates of 
our day.   
A number of insights have been gained from the analysis. With reference to the first part of 
the thesis – which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties 
in Scandinavia – the study has revealed that there exists a scale related to the problem 
definition of welfare migration. At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed 
considered a challenge to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of 
the scale, welfare migration is not considered a problem at all. Rather, labor migration within 
the EU/EEA is seen as problematic because it threatens workers’ rights and leads to social 
dumping. The analysis has also shown that this scale corresponds with the continuum made 
up of the three models of the EU utilized in this thesis, with the nation-based model at one 
end, the multinational federal model in the middle, and the cosmopolitan model at the other 
end. The general pattern is that the parties that are the most concerned about welfare induced 
migration are the parties that most strongly express a nation-based (in some cases a 
multinational federal) view on identity and rights, whereas the parties that are most concerned 
about social dumping are the parties that most strongly express a cosmopolitan view on 
identity and rights.  
There are, however, some significant differences between the three countries. While all the 
Norwegian and Swedish parties that communicate a cosmopolitan view on identity and rights 
express concerns about social dumping, only two out of four Danish parties placing in the 
cosmopolitan model on both dimensions express similar concerns. With reference to concerns 
about welfare migration, the image is a little less clear, and there is more variation between 
the three countries. While all Norwegian parties placing in the nation-based and the 
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multinational federal model of the EU express concerns about the effects of intra-EU 
migration on national welfare systems, there are also a couple of parties placing within the 
cosmopolitan model that express similar concerns (although in less strong terms). The pattern 
in Denmark is similar, with most parties placing in the nation-based and the multinational 
federal models, as well as one party placing in the cosmopolitan model, voicing concerns 
about welfare induced migration. In Sweden, however, only one party (placing within the 
multinational federal model) expresses concerns about the sustainability of national welfare 
systems as a result of intra-EU migration. This suggests that welfare migration is less of an 
issue in Sweden than in the two other countries.    
With reference to the second part of the research question – which model best reflects the 
parties’ perceptions of welfare migration – the study has also provided some interesting 
insights. While the Norwegian parties show inner consistency in placing in the same model on 
both dimensions, a number of Swedish and Danish parties place differently on the two 
dimensions. This might be due to a desire to appear more open than they in fact are, perhaps 
explained by the fact that Sweden and Denmark are members of the EU whereas Norway is 
not. In this study, placement on the rights dimension is considered to be a more accurate 
reflection of the parties’ perceptions of welfare migration – as this dimension is directly 
related to the policies the parties wish to pursue with reference to labor immigrants. 
Comparing the three countries looking only at placement on the rights dimension, the 
cosmopolitan model dominates in Norway, the multinational federal and the cosmopolitan 
models are equally dominating in Sweden, whereas the nation-based and the cosmopolitan 
model are the two dominating models in Denmark.  
Form of affiliation with the EU does not appear to fully account for the differences between 
the three countries with regard to which model dominate and which perceptions of welfare 
migration are the most prevalent. Given that Norway is not a member, Denmark is a member 
but holds several important opt-outs, and Sweden is a fully integrated member, one would 
expect Norwegian parties to be the most concerned about welfare migration, Swedish parties 
to be the least concerned, and Danish parties to be somewhere in-between. This is not the 
case, as Denmark is the country in which most parties express concerns about welfare 
migration, and also the country in which the nation-based model is the most important.  
While form of affiliation could explain why more Swedish than Danish and Norwegian 
parties place within the multinational federal model and why welfare migration is less of an 
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issue in Sweden than in the other two countries, it does not account for the importance of the 
nation-based model in Denmark or the fact that concerns about welfare migration are more 
strongly expressed in Denmark than in Norway. The widespread concern for welfare 
migration in Denmark might, however, be due to the country being a “euroskeptic” within the 
Union. That the Danish people favor intergovernmentalism over supranationalism was made 
obvious upon the creation of the EU, when the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty 
and Denmark subsequently obtained four opt-outs from the EU – all of which pertain to 
central aspects linked to the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation-state. When Norway 
entered into the EEA Agreement, on the other hand, the Norwegian people had to accept the 
foundation of the EEA (i.e. the four freedoms), but did not have to take a stance on the 
Maastricht Treaty or any following treaties.  
One thing that has become clear from the analysis is that all perceptions of welfare migration 
– whether construed as a threat to the sustainability of national welfare systems or as a threat 
to workers’ rights – are expressions of the challenge that the EU poses. EU citizenship, with 
its accompanying supranational rights, challenges not only national institutions and 
sovereignty, but also national feelings of political community and citizenship. The 2004 and 
2007 enlargements of the EU in combination with the right to move and reside freely within 
the EU/EEA (and to not be discriminated on the basis of nationality), has brought this 
question of inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness to the forefront of political debates.  
The parties’ placement in the three different models of the EU says something about how 
open or closed they wish their national communities to be, both in terms of inclusion in the 
community and in terms of access to rights. While parties placing within the nation-based 
model signal unwillingness for further European integration in the EU, parties placing in the 
multinational federal model are more open and positive toward European integration through 
the EU. Parties placing in the cosmopolitan model are arguably the most open. There are, 
however, a number of parties that express cosmopolitan views, but nonetheless oppose EU 
membership. A plausible explanation could be that these parties are not against European 
integration per se, but rather that they are against how European integration is currently being 
pursued in the EU. The challenge that the EU and EU citizenship poses to these parties, is 
related to the social welfare of their country’s citizens.   
While a number of insights have been gained from this study, there are still many questions 
left unanswered. This thesis has been a first attempt at mapping the existing perceptions of 
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welfare migration in Scandinavia, and as such has laid the groundwork for further 
examination. In future studies, it would be interesting to broaden the scope by including other 
types of documents, as well as analyze documents from different points in time. Since party 
platforms are standardized documents expressing a party’s official opinion on a topic, it might 
be interesting to look at less formal documents, such as parliamentary debates, to see if the 
parties’ perceptions of welfare migration remain the same. One might also take the analysis 
out of the purely political sphere and investigate public opinion as expressed in the media. A 
natural future step would also be to examine how different perceptions of welfare migration 
affect policy.  
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